Japan Opinion: Whither Palestine's Sole Right of Representation?
HIRAYAMA Kentaro / Former NHK commentator
April 11, 2006
"The PLO is the sole representative of the Palestinian people"---this is what the PLO led by the late Chairman Yasser Arafat had strongly demanded the international community to acknowledge throughout the mid-1970s, when the whole world was thrown into turmoil by the "oil shock." They advanced this argument, aware of the contention of the Kingdom of Jordan that wanted the sovereignty of the occupied territories to be recovered. After many twists and turns, the PLO's assertion was accepted by the international community, including Jordan and Israel, and became the basis of the subsequent peace process in the Middle East. However, the overwhelming victory of Hamas, an Islamic resistance organization, in the Palestinian Parliamentary elections held on January 25, 2006, actually overturned this premise. While denying Israel the right of existence and refusing to revise their charter that reserves their right of "Jihad," or armed struggle, Hamas is about to take the reins of government as the Palestinian Authority.
Hamas appealed to Fatah to join them in a coalition government, the latter being the political force directly led by the late Chairman Arafat who had been at the helm of the Palestinian Authority. It may well be that Hamas expected Fatah to play the role of a buffer in dealing with the international community including Israel. However, Fatah declined the offer. While the pressures exerted directly by the US government on Fatah may be one of the reasons for Fatah's refusal, what Fatah states as the official reason for their denegation was the Hamas' refusal of accepting PLO's supremacy. Fatah failed to make sure among the Palestinian people that the PLO is "the sole representative," a position they had finally obtained from the international community after a hard and long struggle. For the Palestinian Parliamentary elections, no restrictions were imposed regarding the qualification of candidates with respect to political parties and individuals. It must be pointed out that a total lack of imagination on the part of Fatah who had little thought of the possibility of a defeat and the United States that had continually urged the holding of early "democratic elections", with little thought of this basic premise, might have been to blame.
Mr. Abbas, Fatah's leader and the PLO Chairman, still has three more years as the President of the Palestinian Authority and is a politician far stronger than a mere ceremonial figure, as he directly controls half of the armed police forces (among whom Fatah-affiliated people occupy an overwhelming majority). He even has the authority to dismiss the prime minister, though he has no prerogative to dissolve the parliament. He has also made it clear that he has no intention of handing over power to the incoming Hamas regime, but will personally manage all overseas assets amounting to $1-billion, which the PLO has controlled since the Arafat days. Furthermore, President Abbas, in an interview with an Israeli newspaper, referred to the possibility of secret negotiations with Israel with the United States acting as an intermediary. The Israeli authorities, however, have already stated that Mr. Abbas no longer possesses negotiating competence. The U.S. government has been silent on this matter. Under such circumstances, it seems difficult for the time being to break the deadlock by achieving political "cohabitation" between Abbas (or the PLO) and Hamas.
It appears that Israel views the predicament of the Palestinians as an opportunity to its advantage. The idea of unilaterally removing settlements in the occupied areas on the West Bank that Ehud Olmert, the acting Prime Minister, announced just before the Israeli general election is an indication of such an Israeli view. The successive Israeli regimes, including the one under former Prime Minister Sharon, have advocated the annexation of Ariel, Maale Adumim, Gush Etzion, and the old city of Jerusalem and its environs. They intended to include these so-called "settlements blocks" within the separation walls presently under construction and unilaterally to make these walls as the permanent boundaries with Palestine, while removing in principle all the settlements outside of these walls, within four years. Israel has avoided negotiations on the grounds that there is nobody to negotiate with on the Palestinian side. The launch of a Hamas regime is evidently seen as an opportunity to have the international community as well as the United States recognize the "legitimacy" of the above-mentioned unilateral actions. The settlements from which Mr. Olmert promised to withdraw include Shilo, the area north of Jerusalem and connected with the Old Testament. The extent of the withdrawal appears close to Ehud Barak's proposal made at the Camp David talks, which failed to materialize. There is no doubt, however, that for Israel the re-division plan of the old city of Jerusalem, which then mediator President Clinton had in mind at the time, is out of the question. Together with the items concerning Israeli armed forces that will remain in "evacuated" area and their freedom of action, the Israeli position will continue to stir up hatred and hostility among the Palestinian people.
It is hard to predict whether a lull continues on both sides of the wall, with each side disregarding the other, or the worsening situation brings about "Lebanization" of the whole West Bank area turning it into a "free-fire zone." Whether and in what manner international help is forthcoming to the Palestinians will certainly influence the outcome. In my view there seems no other way than to keep pressure on Hamas to revise their course of action while hoping for Fatah's self-purification and rebirth. At the same time the international community had better avoid official endorsement of the measures unilaterally taken by Israel.
The writer is a former NHK commentator.
Hamas appealed to Fatah to join them in a coalition government, the latter being the political force directly led by the late Chairman Arafat who had been at the helm of the Palestinian Authority. It may well be that Hamas expected Fatah to play the role of a buffer in dealing with the international community including Israel. However, Fatah declined the offer. While the pressures exerted directly by the US government on Fatah may be one of the reasons for Fatah's refusal, what Fatah states as the official reason for their denegation was the Hamas' refusal of accepting PLO's supremacy. Fatah failed to make sure among the Palestinian people that the PLO is "the sole representative," a position they had finally obtained from the international community after a hard and long struggle. For the Palestinian Parliamentary elections, no restrictions were imposed regarding the qualification of candidates with respect to political parties and individuals. It must be pointed out that a total lack of imagination on the part of Fatah who had little thought of the possibility of a defeat and the United States that had continually urged the holding of early "democratic elections", with little thought of this basic premise, might have been to blame.
Mr. Abbas, Fatah's leader and the PLO Chairman, still has three more years as the President of the Palestinian Authority and is a politician far stronger than a mere ceremonial figure, as he directly controls half of the armed police forces (among whom Fatah-affiliated people occupy an overwhelming majority). He even has the authority to dismiss the prime minister, though he has no prerogative to dissolve the parliament. He has also made it clear that he has no intention of handing over power to the incoming Hamas regime, but will personally manage all overseas assets amounting to $1-billion, which the PLO has controlled since the Arafat days. Furthermore, President Abbas, in an interview with an Israeli newspaper, referred to the possibility of secret negotiations with Israel with the United States acting as an intermediary. The Israeli authorities, however, have already stated that Mr. Abbas no longer possesses negotiating competence. The U.S. government has been silent on this matter. Under such circumstances, it seems difficult for the time being to break the deadlock by achieving political "cohabitation" between Abbas (or the PLO) and Hamas.
It appears that Israel views the predicament of the Palestinians as an opportunity to its advantage. The idea of unilaterally removing settlements in the occupied areas on the West Bank that Ehud Olmert, the acting Prime Minister, announced just before the Israeli general election is an indication of such an Israeli view. The successive Israeli regimes, including the one under former Prime Minister Sharon, have advocated the annexation of Ariel, Maale Adumim, Gush Etzion, and the old city of Jerusalem and its environs. They intended to include these so-called "settlements blocks" within the separation walls presently under construction and unilaterally to make these walls as the permanent boundaries with Palestine, while removing in principle all the settlements outside of these walls, within four years. Israel has avoided negotiations on the grounds that there is nobody to negotiate with on the Palestinian side. The launch of a Hamas regime is evidently seen as an opportunity to have the international community as well as the United States recognize the "legitimacy" of the above-mentioned unilateral actions. The settlements from which Mr. Olmert promised to withdraw include Shilo, the area north of Jerusalem and connected with the Old Testament. The extent of the withdrawal appears close to Ehud Barak's proposal made at the Camp David talks, which failed to materialize. There is no doubt, however, that for Israel the re-division plan of the old city of Jerusalem, which then mediator President Clinton had in mind at the time, is out of the question. Together with the items concerning Israeli armed forces that will remain in "evacuated" area and their freedom of action, the Israeli position will continue to stir up hatred and hostility among the Palestinian people.
It is hard to predict whether a lull continues on both sides of the wall, with each side disregarding the other, or the worsening situation brings about "Lebanization" of the whole West Bank area turning it into a "free-fire zone." Whether and in what manner international help is forthcoming to the Palestinians will certainly influence the outcome. In my view there seems no other way than to keep pressure on Hamas to revise their course of action while hoping for Fatah's self-purification and rebirth. At the same time the international community had better avoid official endorsement of the measures unilaterally taken by Israel.
The writer is a former NHK commentator.
The English-Speaking Union of Japan
失念（？）したパレスチナの唯一代表権
平山健太郎 / 元ＮＨＫ解説委員
2006年 4月 11日
「ＰＬＯはパレスチナ人の唯一の代表機関である」・・・あの「石油ショック」が世界を大混乱に巻き込んだ1970年代の中盤、アラファト傘下の当のＰＬＯが国際社会に激しく求めていた議論であった。同じ占領地の主権「回復」を主張していたヨルダン王国を意識した議論だった。曲折の末、ＰＬＯのこの主張はヨルダンやイスラエルを含む国際社会に受け入れられ、その後の中東和平プロセスの基盤になってきた。2006年1月25日のパレスチナ立法評議会選挙でのイスラム抵抗運動「ハマス」の圧勝が、この基盤を覆した。ハマスはイスラエルの生存権を否定し、聖戦（武力闘争）の権利を主張するその憲章の変更を拒絶しながらパレスチナ自治政府の次期政権を担おうとしているからだ。
ハマスは、パレスチナ自治政府の実権をこれまで握ってきた故アラファト議長直系の政治勢力ファタハに連立政権への参加を呼びかけた。イスラエルを含む国際社会との対応にあたってファタハに緩衝材としての役割を期待したのであろうが、ファタハはこれを拒絶している。アメリカ政府からの直接の圧力も、この連立拒否の背景の一つだが、ファタハが自らあげている拒否の理由は、ハマスがＰＬＯの優位性を認めていないという一点であった。ファタハはＰＬＯがかつてあれだけ国際社会に要求してきた自らの「唯一代表権」を足元のパレスチナ民衆の間に定着させることに失敗した。立法評議会の選挙に当たっても、政党や個人の立候補資格には何の制約も設けなかった。敗北の可能性にまったく思い至らなかったファタハの想像力の欠如と言わざるを得ないし、この点への配慮を欠いたままいたずらに「民主的選挙」の早期実施を督促しつづけたアメリカ政府にも責任の一端があるだろう。
ファタハの党首であり、PLOの議長でもあるアバス氏は、パレスティナ暫定自治政府の議長（大統領）としてまだ3年の任期を残しているし、ファタハ系が圧倒的に多い武装警察力の半数を直轄するなど単なる儀礼職を越えた実権を握っている。首相を罷免する権利さえあるが、立法評議会の解散権はない。またアバス議長は、アラファト時代以来ＰＬＯが運用してきた１０億ドルにのぼる在外基金の運用をハマスの次期政権には引き渡さず自らが統括する意向を表明している。アバス議長はさらに、アメリカ政府を仲介にしたイスラエルとの秘密交渉の可能性についてもイスラエル紙とのインタビューで言及しているが、イスラエル当局は、アバス議長の当事者能力は既に失われたと公言しており、アメリカ政府もこの問題については沈黙したままだ。アバス議長あるいはＰＬＯとハマスとの「コアビタシオン」（共生）による局面打開も当面難しそうだ。
パレスチナ側のそうした手詰まり状態をイスラエル側は、むしろ好機の到来と見ているようだ。イスラエル総選挙を間近にオルメルト首相代行が発表しているヨルダン川西岸での一方的な入植地撤去構想である。シャロン首相はもとよりイスラエル側の歴代政権がかねがね併合を主張してきたアリエル、マアレアドミム、グッシュエツィオン、エルサレム旧市外とその周辺などいわゆる入植地「ブロック」を現在建設中の分離壁の内側に包み込んだ上、壁の外側にある入植地は原則としてすべて撤去し、壁を恒久的なパレスチナとの境界線として４年以内に一方的に決めてしまうという内容だ。パレスチナ側に適切な交渉相手がいないというこれまでもしばしば用いてきた回避の理由だが、ハマス政権の誕生は、その一方的な措置の「正当性」がアメリカを始めとする国際社会に追認されるという計算が見え見えである。オルメルト氏が撤去を公約した入植地の中には、エルサレムの北に繋がるシローなど旧約聖書ゆかりの地域もあり、撤退の範囲も、不調に終わったキャンプデービッド交渉でのバラク提案に近いようにさえ見えるが、当時のクリントン調停が視野に置いたエルサレム旧市街の再分割構想などは問題外とされており、入植地撤収後の軍隊の残留とその自由行動などの条項とともにパレスチナ人の敵意をかき立てつづけることは疑いない。壁を挟んで互いに無視しあいながらの小康状態が続くか、「西岸」全域を「フリーファイア・ゾーン」化（レバノン化）する方向に向かうか、予測はきわめて難しい。パレスチナに対する国際的な援助のありようなどが、影響するだろう。
ハマスの路線転換に向け圧力をかけ続けながら、ファタハの自浄と再生に期待をつなぎ、イスラエル側の一方的な措置への公式な追認はひたする避けるほかに打つ手はなさそうである。
（筆者はＮＨＫ元解説委員。）
ハマスは、パレスチナ自治政府の実権をこれまで握ってきた故アラファト議長直系の政治勢力ファタハに連立政権への参加を呼びかけた。イスラエルを含む国際社会との対応にあたってファタハに緩衝材としての役割を期待したのであろうが、ファタハはこれを拒絶している。アメリカ政府からの直接の圧力も、この連立拒否の背景の一つだが、ファタハが自らあげている拒否の理由は、ハマスがＰＬＯの優位性を認めていないという一点であった。ファタハはＰＬＯがかつてあれだけ国際社会に要求してきた自らの「唯一代表権」を足元のパレスチナ民衆の間に定着させることに失敗した。立法評議会の選挙に当たっても、政党や個人の立候補資格には何の制約も設けなかった。敗北の可能性にまったく思い至らなかったファタハの想像力の欠如と言わざるを得ないし、この点への配慮を欠いたままいたずらに「民主的選挙」の早期実施を督促しつづけたアメリカ政府にも責任の一端があるだろう。
ファタハの党首であり、PLOの議長でもあるアバス氏は、パレスティナ暫定自治政府の議長（大統領）としてまだ3年の任期を残しているし、ファタハ系が圧倒的に多い武装警察力の半数を直轄するなど単なる儀礼職を越えた実権を握っている。首相を罷免する権利さえあるが、立法評議会の解散権はない。またアバス議長は、アラファト時代以来ＰＬＯが運用してきた１０億ドルにのぼる在外基金の運用をハマスの次期政権には引き渡さず自らが統括する意向を表明している。アバス議長はさらに、アメリカ政府を仲介にしたイスラエルとの秘密交渉の可能性についてもイスラエル紙とのインタビューで言及しているが、イスラエル当局は、アバス議長の当事者能力は既に失われたと公言しており、アメリカ政府もこの問題については沈黙したままだ。アバス議長あるいはＰＬＯとハマスとの「コアビタシオン」（共生）による局面打開も当面難しそうだ。
パレスチナ側のそうした手詰まり状態をイスラエル側は、むしろ好機の到来と見ているようだ。イスラエル総選挙を間近にオルメルト首相代行が発表しているヨルダン川西岸での一方的な入植地撤去構想である。シャロン首相はもとよりイスラエル側の歴代政権がかねがね併合を主張してきたアリエル、マアレアドミム、グッシュエツィオン、エルサレム旧市外とその周辺などいわゆる入植地「ブロック」を現在建設中の分離壁の内側に包み込んだ上、壁の外側にある入植地は原則としてすべて撤去し、壁を恒久的なパレスチナとの境界線として４年以内に一方的に決めてしまうという内容だ。パレスチナ側に適切な交渉相手がいないというこれまでもしばしば用いてきた回避の理由だが、ハマス政権の誕生は、その一方的な措置の「正当性」がアメリカを始めとする国際社会に追認されるという計算が見え見えである。オルメルト氏が撤去を公約した入植地の中には、エルサレムの北に繋がるシローなど旧約聖書ゆかりの地域もあり、撤退の範囲も、不調に終わったキャンプデービッド交渉でのバラク提案に近いようにさえ見えるが、当時のクリントン調停が視野に置いたエルサレム旧市街の再分割構想などは問題外とされており、入植地撤収後の軍隊の残留とその自由行動などの条項とともにパレスチナ人の敵意をかき立てつづけることは疑いない。壁を挟んで互いに無視しあいながらの小康状態が続くか、「西岸」全域を「フリーファイア・ゾーン」化（レバノン化）する方向に向かうか、予測はきわめて難しい。パレスチナに対する国際的な援助のありようなどが、影響するだろう。
ハマスの路線転換に向け圧力をかけ続けながら、ファタハの自浄と再生に期待をつなぎ、イスラエル側の一方的な措置への公式な追認はひたする避けるほかに打つ手はなさそうである。
（筆者はＮＨＫ元解説委員。）
一般社団法人 日本英語交流連盟