Japan in Their Own Words (JITOW)/日本からの意見

Perspectives on Japan's Value Oriented Diplomacy
NISHIKAWA Megumi / Journalist

November 29, 2013

Perspectives on Japan's Value Oriented Diplomacy



NISHIKAWA Megumi Journalist




Recently, experts from Japan and abroad convened for a symposium titled "Toward the Making of Shared Values in Foreign Policy." Wherein lies the difference between the human rights diplomacy upheld by the United States and Europe, and the value-oriented diplomacy pursued by Prime Minister Abe Shinzo? That was my main interest for attending.

One Japanese scholar offered xxxx insight on the issue. He characterized the western concept of human rights diplomacy as "inclusive universalism" while describing Prime Minister Abe's value-oriented diplomacy as "cohesive universalism." Universalism stands for values and principles such as human rights, democracy and the rule of law, which are now considered global standards.

According to this scholar, the human rights diplomacy of the west is "principle-led" – it takes the value of human rights and seeks to expand it in authoritarian regimes and dictatorial states in a global embrace. In contrast, Prime Minister Abe has adopted the method of emphasizing solidarity within the fold of countries that respect human rights, in order to accentuate the difference with countries that lag in this respect.

Value-oriented diplomacy was first proposed under the first Abe administration in November 2006, in a lecture given by then Foreign Minister Aso Taro at the Japan Institute of International Affairs. It is worth noting that he launched the idea by pairing it with the concept of an "arc of freedom and prosperity."

Mr. Aso expressed the hope that values such as human rights, democracy and the rule of law would expand within an "arc of freedom and prosperity" that lies in a geographic belt extending across Northeast Asia and Central Asia to Central Europe and Eastern Europe, adding that "Japan will serve as an escort runner for democratic states." The point of pairing the concepts was to designate the southern region of Eurasia as a target for spreading the value of human rights so as to encircle China and Russia.

However, the "arc of freedom and prosperity" has become a term seldom mentioned under the second Abe administration. In fact, it seems to me that the administration is deliberately refraining from doing so. Perhaps the current government is concerned that China and Russia may interpret the paired concepts as a ploy to encircle them.

The Japanese scholar mentioned above says the Abe administration's value-oriented diplomacy is built on a weak foundation and that its chances for success are low. His view is probably based on that inherent notion of encirclement.

Expressions such as "sharing values" and "an alliance with countries that share the same values" began to appear in Japan's Diplomatic Blue Book around the start of the 21st century. In that respect, Prime Minister Abe's value-oriented diplomacy did not emerge out of the blue. Yet, not a few observers at the time had sensed the exclusivity and encirclement that were characteristic of Cold War logic in the way the idea was tied to the "arc of freedom and prosperity" during the first Abe administration.

Japan's value-oriented diplomacy should neither be "principle-led" as in the diplomacy of the United States and Europe, nor be an exclusive vocal affirmation of in-group solidarity. An ideal example is the role Japan played in bringing democracy to Myanmar.

When the United States and Europe were bent on showering criticism on the Myanmar government, Japan maintained its connection through grassroots assistance and grant aid, all the while persuading the government to recognize the merits of democracy. It was said at the time that "the Myanmar government rebels against the United States and Europe, but lends an ear to what Japan has to say."

What Japan's value-oriented diplomacy needs is the diplomatic skill of keeping a firm eye on reality while guiding countries towards the universal values of human rights, democracy and the rule of law with quiet dexterity.


Megumi Nishikawa is Expert Senior Writer on the Foreign News Desk at the Mainichi Shimbun newspaper.
The English-Speaking Union of Japan




日本の価値観外交を考える
西川 恵 / ジャーナリスト

2013年 11月 29日
最近、「『価値観外交』の可能性」と題した討論会が、内外の識者を集めて開かれた。米欧の人権外交と安倍晋三首相の価値観外交はどう違うのか。参加するにあたっての私の関心はここにあった。

ある日本人研究家がこの2つの違いについて興味深い切り口を提示した。米欧の人権外交を「包摂的普遍主義」、安倍首相の価値観外交を「団結的普遍主義」と定義する。ここでいう普遍主義とは、いまや世界標準になっている人権や民主主義、法の支配といった価値・理念のことだ。

米欧の人権外交は理念先行型で、人権の価値を権威主義的体制や独裁国家に広げ、世界を包み込んでいこうとする。これに対して安倍首相は、人権を尊重する国々の仲間内の団結を重視し、不十分な国との差異を際立たせる手法をとっているという。

価値観外交が初めて提唱されたのは第一次安倍政権下の2006年11月、日本国際問題研究所での麻生太郎外相の講演だった。注意すべきことは同外相はこの時、価値観外交を「自由と繁栄の弧」とセットで打ち上げたことだ。

同外相は北東アジアから中央アジア、中・東欧に延びる帯状の「自由と繁栄の弧」地帯で、人権、民主主義、法の支配といった価値が広がっていくことの期待を述べた上で、「日本は民主主義各国の伴走ランナーを務める」と語った。つまり2点セットのポイントは、人権価値の拡大先として中国やロシアを包み込むようにユーラシア南部地域を指定したことだ。

しかし第二次安倍政権では「自由と繁栄の弧」という言葉はほとんど聞かれなくなった。むしろ意識的に控えているのではないかと私には思える。2点セットは中国やロシアに対する包囲網と受けとられかねないと考えたのではないだろうか。

先の日本人研究家は「安倍政権の価値観外交の基盤は弱い。成功の可能性は低い」というが、このような包囲網を考えてのことだろう。

外交青書では2000年初頭から「価値観の共有」「価値を同じくする国との連携」といった言葉が現れていて、安倍首相の価値観外交が突然変異で登場したわけではない。ただ第一次安倍政権では「自由と繁栄の弧」に結びつけたところに、排他性と包囲網を特徴とする冷戦思考を嗅ぎ取った人も少なくない。

日本の価値観外交は米欧のような理念先行型でもなく、声高に仲間内の団結を確認する排他的なものであってもならない。この点で参考になるのは、ミャンマーの民主化で日本が果たした役割だ。

米欧がミャンマー政権に批判一点張りの北風を吹かせている時、日本は草の根援助、無償資金協力などで政権とのパイプを維持し、民主化がいかに同国にとってプラスになるか説得を続けた。「ミャンマー政府は米欧には反発するが、日本の言うことには耳を傾けてくれる」と言われていた。日本の価値観外交に必要なのは、現実を見据え、人権や民主主義、法の支配といった普遍的価値に国々を、静かにかつ巧みにいざなう外交力なのである。

(筆者は毎日新聞社専門編集委員。)
一般社団法人 日本英語交流連盟


English Speaking Union of Japan > Japan in Their Own Words (JITOW) > Perspectives on Japan's Value Oriented Diplomacy