August 8, 2001

Since the 19th century, the Korean Peninsula had been likened to a "dagger pointed at Japan from the continent," and to prevent Russia from taking advantage of a weakening China to seize the peninsula had been a strategic goal for Japan. Prior to the Russo-Japanese War, as the Russians built a battery on the southern bank of the Yalu River and acquired naval coaling stations on Korean shores, and as war seemed imminent, Japan's Navy Minister however argued with Army officers who were planning to send divisions into Korea, saying "Why can't we let the Russians take Korea?" It was a legitimate question: if the Japanese Navy could defeat the Russian Fleet, Russian occupation of Korea would not pose a threat to Japan; but on the other hand, if the navy should be defeated, Japanese Army troops being sent into Korea would become prisoners. It was a historical mistake that, as a result of this war Japan committed itself to continental Asia by ruling Korea and turning Manchuria into its sphere of influence. Japan was inevitably confronted with the nationalistic sentiments of the Koreans and the Chinese. If there had been enough support in Japan for the Navy Minister's stance back in 1903, present-day Korea would probably have been one of newly independent republics of the Commonwealth of Independent States, and a pro-Japanese country.

Fortunately, the Russian Far East Forces have all but evaporated. Only two surface combatants are currently operational in the Pacific. And only 86,000 army troops are left in entire Siberia east of the Ural Mountains. If nobody else is to pick up the dagger, there is no reason Japan should either. Since 7th century onwards, China had recognized semi-independent status for Korean, except when preventing it from falling under hostile power's control. The strategic importance of the Korean Peninsula has more or less been lost for Japan as well as for the United States following the collapse of the Soviet Union, making the issue between South Korea and North Korea for the most part an internal issue for the peninsula.

Rather, the biggest concern for Japan and the United States is economic in nature. When North Korea collapses in future and unification is realized, will South Korea, with a much smaller net external credit compared with West Germany and a much fragile economy, be able to withstand the shock of absorbing North Korea, which is incomparably poorer than East Germany? Korea's $140 billion foreign debt will become irrecoverable, but the matter doesn't stop at. The bigger problem is who will foot the bill for rebuilding North Korea - estimated at roughly $1 trillion by South Korea. Being a net debtor nation, the United States does not have the surplus capital. And the textbook issue will make it psychologically difficult for South Korea to seek economic aid or financing from Japan, the largest creditor nation with personal savings exceeding $10 trillion. Meanwhile, Japanese conservatives cannot revert to advocating that Japan "should extend economic aid to prevent the Russians from building naval and air bases on the southern coast of South Korea," and they are themselves finding it harder to call South Korea a "friend."

Economic aid, investment and financing are extended either on the basis of strategic necessity or trust in continued friendly relations. And friendly sentiments are of course mutual. Since it is impossible for the Japanese government to order further revisions to the textbook in question, it is possible that the emotional rift between Japan and South Korea will widen. The peoples of Japan and South Korea may have to open their eyes to the reality that the Cold War is over and countries that belonged to the "Camp of Freedom" in the past aren't necessarily your friends today.

The author is a Senior Defence Correspondent of the Asahi Shimbun.

2001年 8月 8日

19世紀以来、日本では朝鮮半島は"大陸から日本に突付けた短剣に例えられ、中国の弱体化を利してロシアがそれを握ることを防ぐことが日本の戦略目標だった。だが、日露戦争前、ロシアが鴨緑江の南岸に砲台を築き、朝鮮沿岸に海軍の貯炭場を取得し、戦争が迫ったと見えたとき、日本の海軍大臣は２個師団を韓国に送る計画を作っていた陸軍士官たちと議論し「韓国はロシアに取らせてもよいのでは」と述べた。日本海軍がロシア艦隊を破れるなら、韓国をロシアに占領されても日本に危険はない。もし日本海軍が負けるなら、韓国に送られる日本陸軍は捕虜になるのだから、これは正当な疑問だった。日本がこの戦争の結果、朝鮮を統治し、満州を勢力圏としてアジア大陸に関ったことは歴史的失策だった。韓国人、中国人の民族主義感情に面さざるをえなくなった。1903年の日本で海軍大臣の意見が多くの支持者を得ていたら、いま韓国は多分CISの新たに独立した共和国の一つとして、親日的な国だったろう。

幸い極東のロシア軍は今日ほぼ蒸発した。太平洋で可動状態な水上艦は二隻だけ。ウラル山脈から東の全シベリアに８万6000人の陸軍兵士しか残っていない。短剣を拾う人が他にいなければ、日本が拾う必要はない。中国は七世紀以降、朝鮮半島が敵性国の支配下に入ることを防止する以外は介入せず、準独立状態を認めてきた。朝鮮半島の戦略的重要性は、ソ連の崩壊後日本にも、アメリカにとってもほぼ失われ、南北朝鮮間の問題はもっぱら同半島の内部問題となった。

むしろ日本、米国にとって懸念すべき最大の要素は経済的なものだ。北朝鮮が将来崩壊し、統一になった際、西独にくらべてごく僅かな対外純債権しか持たず、はるかに脆弱な経済である韓国が、東独より比較にならない程貧しい北朝鮮を吸収する衝撃に耐えられるか、という点だ。韓国の1400億ドルの対外債務が不良債権化するだけでない。北朝鮮再建に必要と韓国で見積られている約１兆ドルの資金は誰が負担するか、という大問題がある。米国は純債務国でそのような余剰資金はない。最大の債権国であり、10兆ドル以上の個人資金を持つ日本に対して、韓国が再び経済援助や融資を求めることは歴史教科書問題で心理的に困難になるだろう。日本の保守派も「ロシア海、空軍基地が韓国南岸に造られるのを防ぐために経済援助をせよ」と再び主張はできないし、韓国を"味方"と呼びにくくなった。

経済援助や投資・融資は戦略上の必要か、あるいは友好関係への信頼に基づいて行われる。友好感情はもちろん相互的なものであり、日本政府が教科書のこれ以上の訂正を命ずることは不可能である以上、日韓の感情的亀裂は拡がる可能性が高い。日韓両国民は冷戦が終了し、かつての"自由陣営"の国が必ずしも友人ではない、という現実に目を開かされることになるかもしれない。

（筆者は朝日新聞編集委員）