Japan in Their Own Words (JITOW)/日本からの意見

Counter political repression amid China's detainment of Japan citizens
Ken ENDO / Dean, Hokkaido University Graduate School of Public Policy

January 28, 2020
The New Year has arrived but I am still thinking about something that happened last year: the detention in September of a Hokkaido University colleague in China during their participation in academic exchanges.

The incident effectively ended when the professor came home. During the two months of his detention, I had to spend many literally sleepless nights because, as a close colleague, I had no choice but to get involved in his rescue. The family members of the detained had to go through an unimaginable ordeal. Thanks to the tireless efforts of many people, coupled with calls for resolution by academics, the media and civil society, as well as determined actions by top government officials, the case came to a close before the year's end.

Still, the incident continues to pose a question because China's oppressive nature shows no signs of weakening.

The early release was possible thanks to the fortunate timing of the incident. It depended less on Japanese efforts and more on the planned visit to Japan this spring of China's President Xi Jinping as a state guest. China itself hoped to remove possible obstacles to making the visit a success, and Tokyo did try to steer Beijing in that direction.

Dozens of Japanese nationals who have been arrested since the introduction of China's counter-espionage law in 2014 have not been so fortunate. They have been indicted and convicted one after another. Chinese nationals residing in Japan also continue to be detained. Scholars and civil activists from Western countries are no exception. The incident last September is part of this pattern. Now Beijing detains anyone whom it considers to have a negative effect on the maintenance of its regime, and the threshold for such a move is getting lower. Against this backdrop I would like to consider how to counter China from three angles.

First of all, there is the issue of the "at-your-own-risk" attitude in our society toward detained people. If such incidents happen, in other words, how responsible is the Japanese government for solving them? In an authoritarian country such as China, the concept of the "rule of law" is only considered as a tool of control by the Communist Party and "criminal charges" can therefore be conjured up by those in power as they wish. Ordinary activities like buying old books needed for research or interviewing people to learn what is going on can be targets of persecution. As was the case with the September affair, private citizens who have experience working at government agencies tend to be seen with suspicion. Many people in Japan, as well as those in China, determined that individuals with connections to the government's activities were "guilty." People who consider themselves as knowledgeable about China had a stronger tendency in this regard.

Numerous people get involved in grey areas in China. Should they bear the whole responsibility if they are arrested? Considering China's deepening arbitrariness in handling those cases, the Japanese side should think twice when Beijing says someone committed a "crime." What we should do is not blame the individuals themselves but tackle those incidents based on an updated conception of protecting our own citizens.

The second issue I would like to bring up is the bilateral relationship between Japan and China. What is at stake is how we are going to formulate academic, journalistic and other forms of private exchanges between the two countries. This is a tough question because many people think that private-sector exchanges should continue even if government-level ties are deteriorating,

What happened last year shocked the academic world in Japan, and many people now hesitate to visit China. It is only natural that distrust is deepening when researchers, who are supposed to be allowed to collect materials or exchange views freely, are targeted based on arbitrary and tightening detention standards.

Will the targets remain confined to academia? Journalists are next in line, say sources in diplomatic circles. Journalist visas are issued for specific purposes allowed by the Chinese government, but many reporters go beyond those limits and try to contact various sources. Freelance reporters often enter China with no visas. Journalists cannot report on the reality by following lines set by the Chinese government. This means that the Chinese authorities could seize journalists at any time they please. Despite this possibility, few media organizations considered the September case as something affecting them too. In addition, those in corporate circles didn't appear to feel any sense of crisis at all over the incident. In short, little sense of solidarity existed.

As Japan's private and civil sector is divided on the critical issue of being vigilant against arbitrary detentions, is it desirable and effective to pursue forms of private exchanges between Japan and China? That is the question that needs to be asked. People in the private sector must establish a shared understanding of basic freedoms as the indispensable premise for promoting bilateral exchanges.

The third issue I would like to refer to is the future of the wider world. How are we going to tackle China becoming a major power with growing cash reserves and production capacity while it is doing all the things I mentioned above? This question goes beyond Japan-China ties and affects Japan's conduct as a country.

The United Kingdom and the United States, two hegemons that led the world in the 19th and 20th centuries respectively, although they brought about a number of global problems, continued to carry the torch of freedom and democracy. Those two countries are now in the middle of political confusion at a time when an authoritarian country like China is rising, and Japan, despite its postwar success of maintaining freedom and democracy to a certain extent, cannot escape the brunt of such developments.

Inside China, personal dictatorship seems to be solidifying and political repression knows no boundaries. At the country's peripheral regions such as Tibet, the Xinjiang Uygur region, Hong Kong and Taiwan, China's projection of power has resulted in the undermining of human rights. How should Japan tackle these negative developments reaching its shores without sacrificing its own freedom and democracy? It's not an overstatement to say that answering this question will determine the course of Japan in the 2020s.

Receiving President Xi as a state guest without an answer to this particular issue will mean, in the eyes of the world, that Tokyo has given a seal of approval to China's gross violation of human rights. Indeed, one cannot derive a solution to a diplomatic matter based solely on human rights issues, but we should at least have discussions on the pros and cons and possible conditions of his state visit. This is a question requiring our collective, serious reckoning.


Ken Endo is Dean, Hokkaido University Graduate School of Public Policy.
This article was published in the January 19th, 2020 edition of Mainichi Shimbun.
The English-Speaking Union of Japan




中国による邦人拘束 政治的抑圧に向き合え
遠藤 乾 / 北海道大学公共政策大学院院長

2020年 1月 28日
年が明けても、まだ考えていることがある。昨秋、北海道大学の同僚が中国にて学術交流中に拘束された事件についてである。狭義の事件は、本人が帰国したときに終わった。拘束中の2カ月は、近い同僚として解放工作にかかわらざるを得ず、文字通り眠れない日々だった。ご家族の苦悩は想像を絶する。幸い多くの方の尽力の末、学者やメディアなど市民社会が声を上げ、政府首脳が強い意識をもって行動し、年内の解放がかなった。  

しかし、事件はいまだに問いかける。中国の抑圧的な本質は変わっておらず、その傾向は強まりこそすれ、弱まったわけではないからだ。今回の早期解放は、時期的に幸運なことだった。それは、日本側の市民社会による働きかけ以上に、今春予定の習近平国家主席国賓訪日に負うていた。つまり、中国自身がトップ訪日の成功を願い、障害となりうる事案を片付けることを望んだし、そのように日本政府が促したのが大きい。  

中国が反スパイ法を制定して以降逮捕された他の十数人の日本人は、そうした僥倖(ぎょうこう)には恵まれなかった。従って、次々と起訴され、刑を受け続けている。日本在住の中国人が拘束される事例も後を絶たない。西側諸国の学者や市民運動家も例外ではない。今回の事件はその延長上にある。体制維持に不利と北京がみなす人はだれであれ拘束するという意味で、徐々に水位が上がってきているのだ。そうした状況を背景に、改めて中国とどう向き合うのか、三つの面から考えてみたい。

一つは、自己責任論とのかかわりである。裏返すと、今後同様の事態が起きたとき、日本の国家はどこまで責任を負うべきかという問いだ。中国のような権威主義国では、「法治」が共産党支配の道具としてしか捉えられておらず、「犯罪」は恣意(しい)的に構成しうる。研究上必要な古本を買い、現状を知るべく取材をするというごく一般的な活動もまた、対象たりうる。今回のように、政府系機関で働いた経歴をもつ民間人は、マークされやすい。政府とのつながりをもつ者を「クロ」と断ずる人は、中国のみならず日本にも少なくない。今回、中国通を任ずる人ほどその傾向は強かった。  

グレーな領域で中国にかかわる人はいくらでもいる。そのような人は、捕まれば当人の責任なのだろうか。かの国の強まりゆく恣意性に照らしたとき、たとえ中国政府が「クロ」と断じた者だとしても、その判断を日本側が受け入れるべきかは別問題だ。ここには、本人の自己責任に帰すのではなく、邦人保護の概念を練り直して対処する必要がある。  

二つ目は、日中関係にかかわる。とくに学術、ジャーナリズム、ひいては民間レベルの交流をどう紡ぐのかという問題である。民間交流は政府間関係が悪いときでも維持すべきだと多くの人に意識されている分、やっかいな問いとなる。 今回の問題は、学界に衝撃を与えた。訪中をためらう者はいまなお多い。自由な意見交換や資料収集が前提である研究者に縄をかけ、拘束の判断基準が恣意的で、全体に厳しくなりつつある以上、不信が根深くなるのは当然だ。  

問題は学界でとどまるのかどうか。日中外交筋は、次に狙われるのはジャーナリストだと身構える。取材ビザは中国当局が許す特定の目的に合わせて発行されるが、多くの記者はその目的を超えて、さまざまな情報源にアプローチする。フリーの記者はノービザで入ることがある。他方、記者が中国の体制維持に沿う取材ばかりしていては現状に迫れるはずもない。だからいつでも当局は手にかけうるのである。けれども、今回の事件で、メディアが自分の問題で(も)あると受け止めたケースはまれだった。ついでに言えば、企業人が今回の問題で危機感を持った様子はみじんもない。連帯感は希薄だ。  

日本の民間が恣意的な身体拘束への警戒感という根本的なところで分断されるなか、日中民間交流は望ましく、有効だろうか。本当に問われねばならぬことは、それである。交流を進める不可欠な前提として、各界は基本的自由につき共通了解を深めねばならない。  
 
三つ目は、世界の行く末についてである。つまり、このようなことをする中国が、生産・資本面で力をつけ、世界の一大強国になることにどう対処するのか、という点だ。これは日中関係を超えて、日本の生き方にかかわる。  

19~20世紀を主導したヘゲモン(覇権国)である英米は、数々の災難を世界にもたらしもしたが、概して自由や民主のたいまつを掲げつづけた。この2国が、政治的な混乱のただ中にある一方、中国のような権威主義国が目の前で興隆するとき、戦後曲がりなりにも自由や民主を維持してきた日本は、その影響をもろに受けることになる。  

中国国内では、個人独裁の色彩が強まり、政治的抑圧がとどまるところを知らない。周辺部においても、チベット、ウイグル、香港、台湾と、中国の力の投射は人権の切り下げにつながってきた。ひたひたと迫りくるこの否定的な浸透に対し、自らの自由や民主を犠牲にすることなく、日本が対処できるのかどうか。この行方が2020年代の在り方を規定するといっても過言ではない。  

これらに一定の答えを出さぬまま習主席を国賓として迎えれば、日本は世界に対して、かの国の人権蹂躙(じゅうりん)にお墨付きを与えることになる。もちろん、外交上の解を人権問題だけから導くわけにはいかないが、ここは是非や条件を含め議論すべきだ。考えどころである。

筆者は 北海道大公共政策大学院長 本稿は、2020年1月19日付毎日新聞朝刊に掲載された
一般社団法人 日本英語交流連盟


English Speaking Union of Japan > Japan in Their Own Words (JITOW) > Counter political repression amid China's detainment of Japan citizens