In the event, Germany and France should guarantee up to 50 percent of Greece's external debt. Germany has benefited most from the single currency in the ten years since the euro came into circulation. Even the Greek crisis was good news for German exporters. Requiring no effort on their part, the weak euro enabled them to vanquish Japanese exports suffering under the weight of the strong yen in the global arena. Meanwhile, France had their man Jean-Claude Trichet firmly instated as ECB President between 2003 and 2011. It was during this period that Greek finances took a dramatic turn for the worst as the ECB looked the other way, allowing Athens to continue reporting falsified fiscal figures. Such considerations apart, it is nevertheless true that unless Berlin and Paris quickly join hands in a rescue effort, there will be no way out. And Greece is not the one waiting to be rescued here. Germany and France will be rescuing the euro system itself, and consequently, themselves.

Transforming Europe into a greater economic bloc united by a common currency, the euro – the idea signified the establishment of a federal republic of euro with no internal warfare and the creation of an impregnable European bridgehead in anticipation of an era of fierce competition against the United States and other powerful economic regions. European countries merit praise for having had the ability to clearly imagine such a future in the times of Giscard d’Estaing and Helmut Schmidt. Yet, European politicians and bureaucrats, ever masterful at swallowing the unreasonable, were perhaps too clever by half.

The European Monetary System (EMS) and the accounting unit ecu - the nascent form of the euro - first came to light in July 1978 at the summit meeting of the European Community in Bremen, Germany. Chancellor Schmidt chaired the meeting, and his spokesman Klaus Bölling appeared in the press room several times to offer lectures on the fundamentals of international currencies. The EC countries were to gradually narrow the band of exchange rate fluctuations between regional currencies until it ultimately reached zero. This was to give rise to a single European currency that can stand shoulder to shoulder with the U.S. dollar for the first time.

However, being there at the time as a journalist, I felt there was one thing that didn't quite make sense. At the time, the EC was already engaged in so-called "Snake" interventions in the foreign exchange market. But in reality, the three major European currencies – British sterling, French franc and Italian lira – had fallen behind the deutschemark, which was gaining growing confidence in the market, and were being forced to temporarily dislodge from the Snake system or to reduce their parity against the U.S. dollar. When I pointed that out, Mr. Bölling responded by emphasizing that existing gaps among the economic and financial performances of the EC countries will undergo a repeated process of mandatory "convergence."

Listening to his reply I remember thinking that the economies of Germany and Italy will never converge, and I still believe this to be so. Of course, Italy has been making an admirable effort as a starting member of the euro, and should not be viewed in the same vein as Greece. As for the people of Greece, by now I am sure they entertain no illusions about prosperity under the euro. For the Greeks, "convergence" does not mean forcing the citizens of Athens to bow to standards set by the barbaric Gauls of the north. They fondly remember their drachma as a global currency that held sway over a vast region encompassing the Aegean Sea, the Black Sea, the Caspian Sea and the Indian Ocean at the time of Alexander the Great. Once leaving the euro bloc they will get their drachma back, and will rediscover a Greece freed from the dominance of Brussels or Frankfurt.

Meanwhile, the euro countries will enjoy a few months or a few years of respite, only to encounter the next stray sheep. The economic and financial behaviors of countries reflect diverse historic backgrounds and national identities, and are not something that can be bound by artificial and mandatory "convergence."　

The writer is Professor Emeritus in International Politics at Wako University.