'Two Track Negotiations' Offer Illusory Hope
- Russia Must be Drawn Into Realistic Talks on theReturn
of Kunashiri and Shikotan Islands -
HAKAMADA Shigeki Professor at
Aoyama Gakuin University
Japan's new Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi met recently
with her visiting Russian counterpart, Igor Ivanov, to discuss
bilateral diplomatic issues.
Regarding a pending Japan-Russia peace treaty, an influential
Japanese lawmaker proposed in the summer of 2000 that it
be considered separately from the territorial dispute over
a chain of Russian-held islands off Hokkaido that Japan
claims. Some officials attached special importance to the
1956 Japan-Soviet joint declaration that promised the reversion
to Japan of two of the four disputed islands. During a Tokyo
visit in September 2000, Soviet President Vladimir Putin
declared that the declaration was still valid.
In late 2000, Russian authorities mistakenly believed that
Japan had changed its position on the territorial dispute
and was considering signing a peace treaty with Russia in
exchange for the return of only Habomai and Shikotan islands.
Japan had never announced it was ready to accept such a
deal, but suggestions had been made that it was. Bilateral
negotiations on the issue were distorted.
To end the misunderstanding, then Foreign Minister Yohei
Kono told Russian officials during a Moscow visit in January
2001 that Japan would sign the peace treaty only when the
sovereignty issue regarding the four islands was settled.
But this greatly disappointed the Russian officials.
In March 2001 then Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori proposed
to Putin during talks in Irkutsk that simultaneous negotiations
be held on the reversion of the Habomai and Shikotan islands
(whose return was promised in the 1956 declaration) and
on the sovereignty of the Kunashiri and Etorofu islands.
Japan and Russia agreed on the deal when Prime Minister
Junichiro Koizumi met with Putin in Shanghai in October
2001.
The Japanese government's position regarding Habomai and
Shikotan was that negotiations were pending only on the
procedures of reversion since Russia had acknowledged the
validity of the 1956 declaration. Tokyo expected that territorial
negotiations would center on the sovereignty of Kunashiri
and Etorofu. Some Japanese specialists expressed concern
that two-track negotiations on Habomai-Shikotan and Kunashiri-Etorofu
could help a Russian ploy to sign the peace treaty in exchange
for a deal on the former two islands.
Late last year, the Foreign Ministry proposed to Russia
that negotiations be pursued on the reversion of the four
islands as a package. Under the proposal, territorial negotiations
would place emphasis on the sovereignty of Kunashiri and
Etorofu while a special work group would be set up to discuss
details of the return of Habomai and Shikotan. This arrangement
would set up a new framework for simultaneous negotiations.
But Russia turned down the proposal, considering domestic
public opinion against deals with Japan. Last month, Mori
met with Putin and proposed that specific, substantive talks
be held on the territorial issue, regardless of the new
framework. Russia accepted the proposal, and this led to
the recent Kawaguchi-Ivanov talks.
To the disappointment of Russian officials, Japan was cool
to Putin's acknowledgment of the validity of the 1956 declaration.
For Putin, it meant a bold decision as well as a compromise
because there remains strong resistance in Russia to such
action. So far the Russian government has not informed the
public of the acceptance of simultaneous negotiations on
the two sets of islands. Moscow has never said that its
acknowledgment of the 1956 declaration's effectiveness automatically
means its agreement to the reversion of Habomai and Shikotan.
In Russia's view, its acceptance of two-track negotiations
does not make agreement on the reversion of Habomai and
Shikotan a fait accompli. Russian officials are hardly serious
about negotiating the sovereignty of Kunashiri and Etorofu.
It would be an illusion to expect that the agreement on
the two-track talks would lead to some dramatic progress
in negotiations on the peace treaty.
Some Russian diplomatic sources are sounding out Japan
on whether Japan will make more concessions on the sovereignty
of Kunashiri and Etorofu in exchange for a Russian compromise.
This is a delicate issue that will require a political decision
by the leaders of both nations. Putin, in a recent message
to Koizumi, said he was willing to hold serious discussions
to find a mutually acceptable solution to the sovereignty
issue. It is unclear whether this is a delaying tactic or
lip service, or an important signal. Russian moves to sound
out Japan on the sovereignty issue should be carefully examined.
So far Russia is showing little interest in serious negotiations
on the sovereignty of Kunashiri and Etorofu. If Japan leads
Russia to substantive discussions on the issue, negotiations
on the peace treaty will be successful. Japan must stop
Russian moves to sign the peace treaty by returning only
Habomai and Shikotan and convince Russia to negotiate the
sovereignty of Kunashiri and Etorofu. These efforts will
determine the fate of the bilateral peace treaty.
The writer is a Professor of School of International
Politics, Economics, and Business at Aoyama Gakuin University.
He contributed this comment to the Japan Times.
February 24, 2002
