A Dramatic Change in the Japan-U.S. Security Framework
MAGOSAKI Ukeru / Professor, National Defense Academy
July 11, 2006
The Japan-U.S. security relationship is in the midst of a dramatic change. Such change has not simply been limited to actions taken by the two governments, but has now been expressed in documentary form. Specifically, they are the "U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future" published in October 2005 and the "U.S.-Japan Roadmap for Realignment" published in May this year. This is far more serious than resolving the Futenma U.S. base issue that has attracted so much attention in Japan. They are without doubt important documents that will decide Japan's future course, and yet there has been no domestic discussion. There is a world of a difference between how the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty - the framework for today's security arrangement - was produced and revised through political turbulence and fierce debate.
The fundamental nature of the transformation to be brought about by the two documents becomes apparent through comparison with the existing Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, which has served as the backbone of the Japan-U.S. security relationship to this day. Based on this comparison, I would like to examine some of the aspects of the "U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future" that particularly warrant attention.
First of all, Japan-U.S. security cooperation has been redefined as a pursuit of "regional and global common strategic objectives," giving prominence to the "global" arena in seeking cooperation. In comparison, the Security Treaty had limited the regional scope of cooperation to Japan and the Far East.
Japan is expected to play an active role, as seen in expressions such as "the U.S. and Japan contribute as appropriate based on their respective capabilities" and "take necessary measures to establish effective posture." The Security Treaty, on the contrary, had imposed a check on Japan’s actions by quoting from the Japanese Constitution.
The Security Treaty had given prominence to the United Nations by including a reference to its "purposes and principles" that are not found in the recent documents, which instead emphasize the common strategy of the United States and Japan.
The document states in specific terms the need for integration and cooperation on a broad scope - "from unit tactical level through strategic consultations" - to accomplish the above-mentioned objectives, calling for "close and continuous policy and operational coordination" and "enhancing information sharing and intelligence cooperation," "expanding training opportunities in Japan and the United States" and promoting "shared use of facilities".
Major changes are thus expected to occur in the Japan-U.S. relationship, though Japan will be mainly responsible for the changes. The Japanese side is no longer plagued by its past dilemma of "undesired involvement" and ultimate "abandonment" in its relationship with the United States.
Let us now consider the U.S. standpoint. The strategic understanding between Japan and the United States since the latter's occupation was that Japan will join the Western camp, will provide bases for U.S. Forces and will not possess power projection capabilities - the power to launch an offensive attack. These principles have apparently been retained in the new arrangement. Particular emphasis has been placed on this final point, as seen in the statement that "U.S. strike capabilities and the nuclear deterrence provided by the United States remain an essential complement to Japan's defense." Meanwhile, Japan is to "defend itself" in cases including "invasion of remote islands," with the apparent intention of avoiding U.S. involvement in conflicts over the Senkaku Islands and Takeshima.
Thus a new framework for Japan-U.S. security has been formed. In future, the two countries are expected to accelerate bilateral cooperation based on this framework. Arrangements are already underway for joint military exercises. However, this doesn't mean that all is well. In fact, a serious problem lies hidden underneath -a powerful cooperative relationship is being forged without addressing the gap in fundamental strategy that exists between Japan and the United States. What are the two countries'respective strategies in the "global" arena? Since the end of the Cold War, and particularly since 1993, the United States has made its point clear. The North-South issue is the central theme, and democratization will be sought by offering the choice of a regime change. And to that end, it will take military action as necessary. This is also clearly expressed in the current documents, whose goal is to "improve the international security environment."
Now, let us turn to Japan. Japan characterizes its approach to cooperation beyond the Far East, on the international stage, as "humanitarian" and "without human sacrifice." Prime Minister Koizumi Jun'ichiro has also made comments that toe this line. However, this approach is not shared by the United States, which considers "humanitarian" cooperation that doesn't entail "human sacrifice" as merely a transitional phase and seeks "burden sharing" of the risks.
Most Japanese are happy enough to reap the benefits, economic and otherwise, from closer relations with the United States. They are not following specific events in detail. Their view is perhaps based on the thinking that Japan should give the go ahead as long as there are no problems, but should make its position clear once problems do arise – as in the Japan-U.S. issue over beef. A substantial gap exists at the public level with regard to actions to be pursued on the international stage. And as such, the new bilateral security arrangement may be carrying a flashpoint that could cause friction between the two countries or flare up into Japan's domestic political issue in the future.
The writer is Professor at Japan's National Defense Academy and former Japanse Ambassador to Iran.
The fundamental nature of the transformation to be brought about by the two documents becomes apparent through comparison with the existing Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, which has served as the backbone of the Japan-U.S. security relationship to this day. Based on this comparison, I would like to examine some of the aspects of the "U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future" that particularly warrant attention.
First of all, Japan-U.S. security cooperation has been redefined as a pursuit of "regional and global common strategic objectives," giving prominence to the "global" arena in seeking cooperation. In comparison, the Security Treaty had limited the regional scope of cooperation to Japan and the Far East.
Japan is expected to play an active role, as seen in expressions such as "the U.S. and Japan contribute as appropriate based on their respective capabilities" and "take necessary measures to establish effective posture." The Security Treaty, on the contrary, had imposed a check on Japan’s actions by quoting from the Japanese Constitution.
The Security Treaty had given prominence to the United Nations by including a reference to its "purposes and principles" that are not found in the recent documents, which instead emphasize the common strategy of the United States and Japan.
The document states in specific terms the need for integration and cooperation on a broad scope - "from unit tactical level through strategic consultations" - to accomplish the above-mentioned objectives, calling for "close and continuous policy and operational coordination" and "enhancing information sharing and intelligence cooperation," "expanding training opportunities in Japan and the United States" and promoting "shared use of facilities".
Major changes are thus expected to occur in the Japan-U.S. relationship, though Japan will be mainly responsible for the changes. The Japanese side is no longer plagued by its past dilemma of "undesired involvement" and ultimate "abandonment" in its relationship with the United States.
Let us now consider the U.S. standpoint. The strategic understanding between Japan and the United States since the latter's occupation was that Japan will join the Western camp, will provide bases for U.S. Forces and will not possess power projection capabilities - the power to launch an offensive attack. These principles have apparently been retained in the new arrangement. Particular emphasis has been placed on this final point, as seen in the statement that "U.S. strike capabilities and the nuclear deterrence provided by the United States remain an essential complement to Japan's defense." Meanwhile, Japan is to "defend itself" in cases including "invasion of remote islands," with the apparent intention of avoiding U.S. involvement in conflicts over the Senkaku Islands and Takeshima.
Thus a new framework for Japan-U.S. security has been formed. In future, the two countries are expected to accelerate bilateral cooperation based on this framework. Arrangements are already underway for joint military exercises. However, this doesn't mean that all is well. In fact, a serious problem lies hidden underneath -a powerful cooperative relationship is being forged without addressing the gap in fundamental strategy that exists between Japan and the United States. What are the two countries'respective strategies in the "global" arena? Since the end of the Cold War, and particularly since 1993, the United States has made its point clear. The North-South issue is the central theme, and democratization will be sought by offering the choice of a regime change. And to that end, it will take military action as necessary. This is also clearly expressed in the current documents, whose goal is to "improve the international security environment."
Now, let us turn to Japan. Japan characterizes its approach to cooperation beyond the Far East, on the international stage, as "humanitarian" and "without human sacrifice." Prime Minister Koizumi Jun'ichiro has also made comments that toe this line. However, this approach is not shared by the United States, which considers "humanitarian" cooperation that doesn't entail "human sacrifice" as merely a transitional phase and seeks "burden sharing" of the risks.
Most Japanese are happy enough to reap the benefits, economic and otherwise, from closer relations with the United States. They are not following specific events in detail. Their view is perhaps based on the thinking that Japan should give the go ahead as long as there are no problems, but should make its position clear once problems do arise – as in the Japan-U.S. issue over beef. A substantial gap exists at the public level with regard to actions to be pursued on the international stage. And as such, the new bilateral security arrangement may be carrying a flashpoint that could cause friction between the two countries or flare up into Japan's domestic political issue in the future.
The writer is Professor at Japan's National Defense Academy and former Japanse Ambassador to Iran.
The English-Speaking Union of Japan
日米安全保障体制の激変
孫崎 享 / 防衛大学校教授
2006年 7月 11日
日米安全保障関係は今激変の中にある。この変化は単に行政間の行動のみならず文書で明示された。具体的には2005年10月の「日米同盟・未来のための変革と再編」と本年5月の「再編実施のためのロードマップ」である。それは今日本国内で注目されている普天間基地の処理を越える重大問題である。これらは間違いなく将来の日本の方向を決める重大文書にもかかわらず、国内で議論が先ずない。今日の安全保障体制の枠組みである日米安保条約が政治の激動と、激しい論戦を経過して生まれ修正されてきたのと雲泥の違いがある。
「日米同盟・未来のための変革と再編」等が如何に重大な変化をもたらすものであるかは、今日まで日米安保関係の基盤である既存の日米安保条約と対比すれば如何に根本的変革がもたらされたかがわかる。この比較も背景にしつつ、特に「日米同盟・未来のための変革と再編」で注目される点を列挙してみたい。
（１）日米安全保障での協力を「地域及び世界における共通の戦略目標を達成するため」とし、協力の舞台に「世界」を前面に出している（安保条約では地域を日本と極東に限定）
（２）「日本及び米国は各々の能力に応じ適切な貢献を行う」「実効的な態勢を確立するための必要な措置をとる」と日本の積極的対応への期待が示された。（安保条約では憲法を引用するなどむしろ日本の動きを牽制するもの）
（３）安保条約では「国連憲章の目的及び原則」等国連を前面にだしているが今回はそれがみられず、米国、日本の共通の戦略が重視されている。
（４）上記目的を達成するため「部隊レベルから戦略的レベルまで政策及び運用の調整を行い」、「部隊レベルから国家戦略レベルまでの情報共有と協力を向上させ」「共通の訓練、演習の機会を拡充させ」「施設の共同使用を進める」など広範な範囲での一体化、協力化が具体的に明記されている。
こうして日米関係は大幅な変化が予定されるが、それは主として日本側対応である。日本側にはかっての「巻きこまれと見捨てられ」のジレンマはない。
他方、米国側の対応はどうであろうか。占領以降の日米戦略的取り決めは（1）日本は西側陣営につく（２）日本は米軍に基地を与える（3）日本はpower projection 能力を持たない（攻撃能力は持たない）から成るとされるが、この原則は継続されていると見ていい。特に（３）に関しては、「米国の打撃力、核抑止力は日本の防衛を確保する上で不可欠」との記述があるのは、これを意識してのものであろう。また「日本は島嶼部への侵略では自らを守る」として米国が尖閣列島、竹島などの問題に巻き込まれることを回避しているとみられる。
こうして、日米安全保障体制の新たな枠組みが形成された。今後これに沿い、協力関係は促進されていこう。すでに訓練では日米共同に向け、動いている。では、何ら問題がないのであろうか。実は深刻な問題が潜んでいる。基本的戦略に関する日米間の乖離が存在するまま、強力な協力関係が構築されんとする点である。「世界」を舞台に如何なる戦略を実現せんとしているのか。この点米国は冷戦以降、特に1993年以降明確にしてきた。南北関係を中枢にすえる、体制変換を選択肢にして民主化を促進する。そのため必要に応じ軍事行動をとる。それは今回の文書において「国際的な安全保障環境を改善すること」が目標とされていることでも明確である。
他方、日本はどうか。極東を越えて国際舞台での協力を「人道的」かつ「人的犠牲なし」ととらえている。小泉総理の発言もこのラインである。米国はそうは捉えていない。「人道的、人的犠牲なし」はあくまで過渡期の現象であり、「危険の負担」を求めている。
多くの日本国民は「日米関係が促進され、（経済などの）利益があればいいではないの」と見ている。具体的動きは詳細に見ていない。日米牛肉問題のように「問題になるまではGOでいい。逆に問題が出たら立場は鮮明にする」というものであろう。「国際舞台で何を行うか」において少なくとも国民レベルで大きな乖離が存在している以上、将来日米間の火種になるか、日本国内政治上の火種になる可能性を内蔵している。
（筆者は防衛大学校教授。元駐イラン大使。）
「日米同盟・未来のための変革と再編」等が如何に重大な変化をもたらすものであるかは、今日まで日米安保関係の基盤である既存の日米安保条約と対比すれば如何に根本的変革がもたらされたかがわかる。この比較も背景にしつつ、特に「日米同盟・未来のための変革と再編」で注目される点を列挙してみたい。
（１）日米安全保障での協力を「地域及び世界における共通の戦略目標を達成するため」とし、協力の舞台に「世界」を前面に出している（安保条約では地域を日本と極東に限定）
（２）「日本及び米国は各々の能力に応じ適切な貢献を行う」「実効的な態勢を確立するための必要な措置をとる」と日本の積極的対応への期待が示された。（安保条約では憲法を引用するなどむしろ日本の動きを牽制するもの）
（３）安保条約では「国連憲章の目的及び原則」等国連を前面にだしているが今回はそれがみられず、米国、日本の共通の戦略が重視されている。
（４）上記目的を達成するため「部隊レベルから戦略的レベルまで政策及び運用の調整を行い」、「部隊レベルから国家戦略レベルまでの情報共有と協力を向上させ」「共通の訓練、演習の機会を拡充させ」「施設の共同使用を進める」など広範な範囲での一体化、協力化が具体的に明記されている。
こうして日米関係は大幅な変化が予定されるが、それは主として日本側対応である。日本側にはかっての「巻きこまれと見捨てられ」のジレンマはない。
他方、米国側の対応はどうであろうか。占領以降の日米戦略的取り決めは（1）日本は西側陣営につく（２）日本は米軍に基地を与える（3）日本はpower projection 能力を持たない（攻撃能力は持たない）から成るとされるが、この原則は継続されていると見ていい。特に（３）に関しては、「米国の打撃力、核抑止力は日本の防衛を確保する上で不可欠」との記述があるのは、これを意識してのものであろう。また「日本は島嶼部への侵略では自らを守る」として米国が尖閣列島、竹島などの問題に巻き込まれることを回避しているとみられる。
こうして、日米安全保障体制の新たな枠組みが形成された。今後これに沿い、協力関係は促進されていこう。すでに訓練では日米共同に向け、動いている。では、何ら問題がないのであろうか。実は深刻な問題が潜んでいる。基本的戦略に関する日米間の乖離が存在するまま、強力な協力関係が構築されんとする点である。「世界」を舞台に如何なる戦略を実現せんとしているのか。この点米国は冷戦以降、特に1993年以降明確にしてきた。南北関係を中枢にすえる、体制変換を選択肢にして民主化を促進する。そのため必要に応じ軍事行動をとる。それは今回の文書において「国際的な安全保障環境を改善すること」が目標とされていることでも明確である。
他方、日本はどうか。極東を越えて国際舞台での協力を「人道的」かつ「人的犠牲なし」ととらえている。小泉総理の発言もこのラインである。米国はそうは捉えていない。「人道的、人的犠牲なし」はあくまで過渡期の現象であり、「危険の負担」を求めている。
多くの日本国民は「日米関係が促進され、（経済などの）利益があればいいではないの」と見ている。具体的動きは詳細に見ていない。日米牛肉問題のように「問題になるまではGOでいい。逆に問題が出たら立場は鮮明にする」というものであろう。「国際舞台で何を行うか」において少なくとも国民レベルで大きな乖離が存在している以上、将来日米間の火種になるか、日本国内政治上の火種になる可能性を内蔵している。
（筆者は防衛大学校教授。元駐イラン大使。）
一般社団法人 日本英語交流連盟