Japan in Their Own Words (JITOW)/日本からの意見

Emperor Showa and the Yasukuni Shrine
FUKUHARA Koichi / Journalist

August 11, 2006
The media report that Emperor Showa, out of displeasure over the enshrining of Class A war criminals at the Yasukuni shrine, decided to refrain from any further visits to the shrine has helped bring into clearer focus the points of contention in the debate over Prime Minister Koizumi's visits to the Yasukuni shrine.

Prime Minister Koizumi has said, "Paying respects at the Yasukuni shrine is a matter of the heart. Every one (emperors and prime ministers included) is free to go and not to go." The prime minister and the late emperor differ significantly in their attitude toward the Yasukuni shrine. Emperor Showa, as the head of state at the time of Japan's defeat, gravely took to heart the issues of war responsibility and the war criminals. The prime minister manifested Japanese nationalism by engaging actively in diplomacy in pursuit of a political status on the international stage befitting the second most powerful economy in the world. It seems abundantly clear which stance more squarely addresses the foreign policy challenges Japan faces and will serve better the purpose of overcoming them.

At the outset of the occupation of Japan, the United States decided to ensure the efficiency of administration by allowing the Imperial system to continue. Emperor Showa won the trust of the occupying authority by adhering to an attitude that clearly showed his deep recognition of his war responsibility. At the same time he understood that the question of his own war responsibility could not be settled by the wishes of the US alone.

Who will bear the responsibility for the war on behalf of the emperor? That question was more or less settled as the verdicts for Class A war criminals by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East were finalised and the war criminals themselves accepted their fate, which was to bear the blame on behalf of the emperor.

The enshrining of the Class A war criminals later has been interpreted as an act to honour them, an act meant to nullify the significance of the Tokyo War Tribunal. It was an act that risked bringing back to square one the debate over war responsibility including that of the emperor. When the emperor commented that "The son does not appreciate the reflections of the father" in relation to the person who rammed the decision to enshrine the Class A war criminals he was directing his concern to many who did not appreciate the weightiness of war responsibility.

The process that led to the normalisation of relations between Japan and China in 1972 also attested to the emperor's concerns. When waiving China's claim to war reparations Mao Ze-dong and Zhou En-lai, who at the time enjoyed unfettered leadership, attempted to convince the Chinese people that "the Japanese masses should not be forced to bear the burden of reparations because of a handful of Japanese militarists." This magnanimity moved the Japanese people who were truly grateful. Yet, they remained oblivious to the gravity of the reference to "the burden of reparations because of a handful of Japanese militarists."

Among the Chinese masses, those who suffered mightily in the war against Japan but had no say whatsoever in the process of normalisation of relations, deep-rooted discontent and mistrust remained toward the Japan policy of the central government. Resentment and hostility built up toward Japan that continued to slight the issue of war responsibility. The anti-Japanese demonstrations that raged in many parts of China in the spring of 2005, far surpassing any scale the Chinese authorities had anticipated, had their roots in this deep-seated contradiction.

For the Hu Jintao administration, no matter how important it may view its relations with Japan, it is virtually impossible to modify its stance of refusing to meet with a prime minister who continues to pay respects at the Yasukuni shrine. Especially so as the administration strives to realise a "society in harmony" by containing internal contradictions while increasingly integrating its economy with the world economy to sustain rapid economic growth.

Prime Minister Koizumi has criticized China saying "My visits to the Yasukuni shrine have nothing to do with the enshrinement of the war criminals" and "It is unreasonable to refuse to have summit meetings with me over a single issue, i.e. the visits to the Yasukuni shrine." The government and the Liberal Democratic Party also have defended the prime minister on the grounds that the prime minister cannot refrain from paying respects at the shrine because China said not to do so and that pending issues between the two countries will not disappear just because the prime minister stops visiting the shrine. These sound like inward-looking excuses lacking willingness and sincerity to mend relations with China. The candidates for the presidential election of the Liberal Democratic Party in September who are jockeying to become Koizumi's successor are hesitating to inherit the prime minister's logic and are trying to figure out a more convincing position on the question.

There is only one way for Japan to quickly improve diplomacy with Asia. The new Japanese prime minister needs to take to heart the recently disclosed wishes of Emperor Showa and to strive to prepare the ground for a Japan-China summit. He needs to engage in a sincere and honest dialogue on future exchanges and cooperation between the two countries.

The writer is former Chief Editorial Writer of Kyodo News Agency
The English-Speaking Union of Japan




昭和天皇と靖国神社
福原亨一 / ジャーナリスト

2006年 8月 11日
昭和天皇がA級戦犯の靖国神社合祀を不快に思いその後の参拝をやめた、との報道を契機に、首相の靖国参拝をめぐる議論が整理され、論点がはっきりしてきた。

小泉首相は『靖国参拝は心の問題だから、行ってもいいし、行かなくてもいいし、(天皇でも、首相でも)誰でも自由だ』とコメントした。敗戦時の国家元首として戦争責任や戦犯の問題を深刻に受け止めた昭和天皇と、戦後60年、世界第二の経済力にふさわしい政治的地位を求めて積極的に対外行動を展開する日本ナショナリズムを体現する首相と、靖国問題に取り組む姿勢は大きく異なるが、どちらが当面の日本の外交課題を直視し、その打開に役立つことになるか、おのずから明らかではないか。

米国は日本占領に当たって天皇制を存続させ、占領を効率的に進める方針をとった。昭和天皇は戦争責任を深く自覚した態度で占領当局の信頼を確保する一方、自らの戦争責任問題が米国の意向だけで片付かないことも理解していた。天皇のかわりに誰が責任を負うのか、極東軍事裁判がA級戦犯の有罪を確定して初めて戦争責任の問題に一応の決着がつき、戦犯たちも「天皇の身代わり」として自らの運命を受け入れた。

後に靖国神社がA級戦犯を合祀したことは戦犯を顕彰し、極東軍事裁判の意義を否定する行為と解釈され、天皇を含む戦争責任の論議を振り出しに戻す危険をはらんでいた。合祀を強行した責任者に対して、天皇が「親の心子知らず」と評したのは、戦争責任の重さを理解しない他の多くの関係者にも向けられた憂慮の表れだった。     

1972年の日中国交正常化の経過も、天皇の懸念を裏書きした。当時、圧倒的な指導力をふるった毛沢東、周恩来は対日賠償請求を放棄するに当たって「少数の日本軍国主義者の責任を広範な日本人民に償わせてはならない」との論理で中国人民を納得させようとした。日本人は寛大な態度に感謝、感激したが、それとセットになって言及された「少数の軍国主義者の責任」の重みには鈍感だった。

一方、日本との戦争で甚大な被害を受けながら、対日正常化の過程で全く発言権を持たなかった中国大衆の間には、政府の対日外交への根深い不満、不信が残った。戦争責任の問題を軽く扱う日本への反感、敵意も蓄積された。2005年春、中国各地で当局の予想を超える大規模な反日デモが起きた裏にはそれだけの根深い矛盾が潜んでいた。

経済の国際化を進め高度成長を維持しながら、内部矛盾を抑えて「調和社会」を目指す胡錦涛政権は、日本重視を強調しても、国内世論に配慮すれば「靖国参拝を強行する首相と首脳会談はしない」との態度を改めることは難しい。

小泉首相は「私の靖国参拝は戦犯合祀とは無関係」「靖国参拝の一事を理由に首脳会談を拒むのは不当」と中国を非難してきた。さらに政府、自民党は「中国に言われて参拝をやめるわけにはいかない」「参拝をやめても日中間の懸案がなくなるわけではない」などと首相を擁護して来た。いずれも内向きの弁明に響き、関係打開の意欲と誠意に欠けるうらみがある。9月の自民党総裁選で小泉後継の座をうかがう候補たちも、これらの論理の継承をためらい、より説得力を持つ立場を模索している。

今回明らかにされた昭和天皇の意向を活かし、新首相ができるだけ早く日中首脳会談で率直に今後の交流・協力を話し合えるよう条件を整えるほかに、アジア外交打開の近道はないだろう。

(筆者は元共同通信論説委員長。)
一般社団法人 日本英語交流連盟


English Speaking Union of Japan > Japan in Their Own Words (JITOW) > Emperor Showa and the Yasukuni Shrine