Prime Minister Abe Makes Head Start With Diplomacy
FUKUHARA Koichi / Journalist
December 11, 2006
On October 8, Japan's Prime Minister Abe Shinzo held talks with Chinese President Hu Jintao in Beijing and issued a joint communiqué declaring that "both sides shared the view that the two countries would strive to build a mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests." On the next day, Abe was in Seoul for an exchange of views with South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun on North Korea's nuclear tests. Subsequent to these visits, Japan worked with the United States for a United Nations resolution to impose sanctions against North Korea, succeeding in attaining a unanimous vote including China on October 14.
Abe dashed off to a head start by visiting China and South Korea, and in one grand stroke not only broke Japan's diplomatic impasse in Asia – the most troubling legacy inherited from the administration of predecessor Koizumi Jun'ichiro - but managed to stabilize the foundation of his new government as well.
Emphasizing his youth as the country's "first prime minister from the postwar generation and the youngest in the postwar era," and eagerly presenting himself as a "fighter politician," Abe nevertheless demonstrated a sturdy flexibility when it came to diplomacy.
Establishing himself as a protégé of former Prime Minister Koizumi during the five and a half years of his leadership, Abe rapidly solidified his political base and rose steadily to the seat of power backed by the influential Koizumi camp. As such, he would normally be expected to fully uphold the policies of the outgoing administration. However, owing to widespread recognition both at home and abroad that Koizumi's Asian diplomacy was a failure, Abe managed to break from Koizumi's stubborn political commitment of visiting Yasukuni Shrine and adopt a tactic of ambiguity, making no public comment with regard to his own visit to the shrine.
Meanwhile, there was growing recognition on the Chinese part that it was not to its advantage to continuously raise the Yasukuni issue as a reason for refusing a meeting between the heads of state and thus leave relations with Japan to deteriorate. Former president Jiang Zemin repeatedly criticized Japan's historical perception during his visit in 1998 and had tended towards fueling anti-Japanese sentiment. In contrast, Hu Jintao had apparently been contemplating an improvement in China's relationship with Japan from the time he took office as President in 2003. However, while his government advocated the building of a "Harmonious Society" in response to mounting domestic problems including widening disparities, government corruption and a worsening environment, and emphasized the importance of Good-Neighbor Diplomacy as a precondition, it had yet to establish the authority to make a serious effort towards resolving the nation’s deeply-rooted distrust against Japan.
Anti-Japanese demonstrations that spread throughout China last spring demonstrated the danger of mass dissatisfaction with domestic issues such as corruption erupting in the form of anti-Japanese activity. The dismissal of a top member of the Communist Party organization in Shanghai - Jiang Zemin's power base - in late September, and the adoption of the "Decision on Significant Issues Regarding the Construction of a Harmonious Society" by the Central Committee of the Communist Party, which assembled on the very day of the Japan-China meeting, symbolically demonstrated that Hu Jintao's policies have begun to take root, and form an important backdrop to improving the bilateral relationship.
Once convinced that Abe would not pay a visit to Yasukuni Shrine, Hu accepted Abe's visit without seeking further "assurances." The communiqué announced at the joint press conference following the meeting included a positive assessment of Japan's postwar progress as a peaceful nation, clearly identified energy, environmental protection, finance, information technology, protection of intellectual property and other areas as priority issues of mutual cooperation between Japan and China, expressed "deep concern" against North Korea's nuclear tests and declared bilateral cooperation towards realizing a non-nuclear Korean Peninsula and maintaining peace and stability in northeast Asia. It was a straightforward expression of Hu Jintao's expectations towards the Japan-China relationship.
North Korea's nuclear tests highlighted the seriousness of the situation in northeast Asia and added a dramatic accent to the Japan-China meeting. China, which had been committed to its position of defending North Korea, openly criticized the country for the first time and voted for the U.N. sanctions. North Korea does not hide its desire to possess nuclear arms nor its dissatisfaction with China. This poses a continuing challenge for China's "Good-Neighbor Diplomacy."
While Japan and China have agreed to cooperate in dealing with the situation, their interests in North Korea and sentiments toward this neighbor remain wide apart. Prime Minister Abe has focused on the abduction issue from an early stage, forming a special taskforce within the Cabinet. Seeking ways for Japan to move in step with China, which must respond to the North Korean issue from a broader, more complex perspective, will present a major test for the renewed relationship between Japan and China.
The writer is former Chief Editorial Writer of Kyodo News Agency
Abe dashed off to a head start by visiting China and South Korea, and in one grand stroke not only broke Japan's diplomatic impasse in Asia – the most troubling legacy inherited from the administration of predecessor Koizumi Jun'ichiro - but managed to stabilize the foundation of his new government as well.
Emphasizing his youth as the country's "first prime minister from the postwar generation and the youngest in the postwar era," and eagerly presenting himself as a "fighter politician," Abe nevertheless demonstrated a sturdy flexibility when it came to diplomacy.
Establishing himself as a protégé of former Prime Minister Koizumi during the five and a half years of his leadership, Abe rapidly solidified his political base and rose steadily to the seat of power backed by the influential Koizumi camp. As such, he would normally be expected to fully uphold the policies of the outgoing administration. However, owing to widespread recognition both at home and abroad that Koizumi's Asian diplomacy was a failure, Abe managed to break from Koizumi's stubborn political commitment of visiting Yasukuni Shrine and adopt a tactic of ambiguity, making no public comment with regard to his own visit to the shrine.
Meanwhile, there was growing recognition on the Chinese part that it was not to its advantage to continuously raise the Yasukuni issue as a reason for refusing a meeting between the heads of state and thus leave relations with Japan to deteriorate. Former president Jiang Zemin repeatedly criticized Japan's historical perception during his visit in 1998 and had tended towards fueling anti-Japanese sentiment. In contrast, Hu Jintao had apparently been contemplating an improvement in China's relationship with Japan from the time he took office as President in 2003. However, while his government advocated the building of a "Harmonious Society" in response to mounting domestic problems including widening disparities, government corruption and a worsening environment, and emphasized the importance of Good-Neighbor Diplomacy as a precondition, it had yet to establish the authority to make a serious effort towards resolving the nation’s deeply-rooted distrust against Japan.
Anti-Japanese demonstrations that spread throughout China last spring demonstrated the danger of mass dissatisfaction with domestic issues such as corruption erupting in the form of anti-Japanese activity. The dismissal of a top member of the Communist Party organization in Shanghai - Jiang Zemin's power base - in late September, and the adoption of the "Decision on Significant Issues Regarding the Construction of a Harmonious Society" by the Central Committee of the Communist Party, which assembled on the very day of the Japan-China meeting, symbolically demonstrated that Hu Jintao's policies have begun to take root, and form an important backdrop to improving the bilateral relationship.
Once convinced that Abe would not pay a visit to Yasukuni Shrine, Hu accepted Abe's visit without seeking further "assurances." The communiqué announced at the joint press conference following the meeting included a positive assessment of Japan's postwar progress as a peaceful nation, clearly identified energy, environmental protection, finance, information technology, protection of intellectual property and other areas as priority issues of mutual cooperation between Japan and China, expressed "deep concern" against North Korea's nuclear tests and declared bilateral cooperation towards realizing a non-nuclear Korean Peninsula and maintaining peace and stability in northeast Asia. It was a straightforward expression of Hu Jintao's expectations towards the Japan-China relationship.
North Korea's nuclear tests highlighted the seriousness of the situation in northeast Asia and added a dramatic accent to the Japan-China meeting. China, which had been committed to its position of defending North Korea, openly criticized the country for the first time and voted for the U.N. sanctions. North Korea does not hide its desire to possess nuclear arms nor its dissatisfaction with China. This poses a continuing challenge for China's "Good-Neighbor Diplomacy."
While Japan and China have agreed to cooperate in dealing with the situation, their interests in North Korea and sentiments toward this neighbor remain wide apart. Prime Minister Abe has focused on the abduction issue from an early stage, forming a special taskforce within the Cabinet. Seeking ways for Japan to move in step with China, which must respond to the North Korean issue from a broader, more complex perspective, will present a major test for the renewed relationship between Japan and China.
The writer is former Chief Editorial Writer of Kyodo News Agency
The English-Speaking Union of Japan
安倍外交のスタートダッシュ
福原亨一 / ジャーナリスト
2006年 12月 11日
安倍首相は10月８日、北京で胡錦涛主席と会談し『共通の戦略的利益に立つ互恵関係の構築に努力することで一致した』と共同プレス発表した。翌９日はソウルでノムヒョン大統領と同日朝の北朝鮮の核実験について意見を交換。このあと日本は米国と共に国連安保理で北朝鮮制裁決議を推進、14日に中国を含む全会一致の議決に成功した。
「安倍外交のスタートダッシュ」とも呼ぶべき中韓歴訪によって、小泉政権から引き継いだ最大の負の遺産＝アジア外交の行き詰まり＝を一気に清算したばかりでなく、新政権そのものの基盤を安定させる効果も大きかった。
「戦後生まれで初、戦後では最年少」と若さを強調し、「闘う政治家」の気負いを見せた首相が、外交の場では意外に手堅い柔軟さを発揮した。それ以上に小泉時代の日中両国は相互に反発、不信を繰り返しながら、それぞれの内部で問題点の認識、反省が進み、小泉退陣の際は必ず局面を打開しよう、との機運が生まれていたことが重要だ。
安倍は５年半の小泉政権下で前首相に寵愛されて急速に政治基盤を固め、強力な小泉支持勢力に支えられて順調に政権を握った。従って前政権の政策を全面継承するのが自然だが、小泉のアジア外交は失敗との評価が内外で定着していたから、安倍は小泉が最後まで固執した「公約」の靖国参拝を継承せず、自身の靖国参拝については一切公言しない「曖昧戦術」へ切り替えることができた。
一方、中国側にも靖国問題を理由に首脳会談を拒み続け、対日関係を悪化に任せるのは得策でない、との考えが広がってきた。江沢民前主席は1998年の訪日で日本の歴史認識批判を繰り返すなど、反日意識をあおる傾向があったが、2003年に国家主席に就任した胡錦涛は当初から対日関係の改善を考えていたフシがある。しかし格差の拡大、政権の腐敗、環境問題の深刻化など山積する内政課題に対処する「調和社会」を唱えた胡錦涛政権は、その前提として「善隣外交」を強調したものの、根深い対日不信の解消を本気で進めるだけの権威は確立していなかった。
昨年春、中国各地に広がった反日デモは、政治の腐敗など内政に対する大衆の不満が反日の言動にはけ口を求める危険を示した。今年９月末、江沢民の地盤である上海の共産党組織のトップが汚職容疑で解任されたこと、安倍・胡会談の当日に始まった中共中央委総会が「調和社会建設の重大問題に関する決定」を採択したことは、胡錦涛の政策が浸透し始めたことを象徴し、日中関係改善の重要な背景だ。
今回、胡錦涛は『安倍は靖国に参拝しない』との心証を得ると、それ以上の「確約」を求めることなしに安倍訪中を受け入れた。会談後の日中共同プレス発表は「戦後日本の平和国家としての歩み」を積極的に評価し、エネルギー、環境保護、金融、情報通信技術、知的財産保護等を日中互恵協力の重点項目として明記し、北朝鮮の核実験に「深い憂慮」を表明、朝鮮半島の非核化の実現、北東アジアの平和と安定維持のための日中協力を表明した。胡錦涛の日中関係への期待を素直に表現したものだ。
北朝鮮の核実験は、北東アジア情勢の深刻さを浮き彫りにし、日中首脳会談に劇的な彩りを添えた。これまで一貫して北朝鮮を擁護する態度をとってきた中国が初めて北朝鮮を公然と批判し、国連の制裁決議に賛成した。北朝鮮は核保有の意欲も中国への不満も隠していない。中国の「善隣外交」はなお大きな試練にさらされている。
日中は協力してこの事態に対処することになったが、北朝鮮に対する両国の利害関係、隣人意識には大きな差が残ったままだ。安倍首相は早くから拉致問題に関心を集中、内閣に特殊の布陣もしいた。より広く複雑な視点から朝鮮情勢に対処せざるを得ない中国とどう歩調を合わせて行くか、再出発した日中関係の大きな試金石になるだろう。
（筆者は元共同通信論説委員長）
「安倍外交のスタートダッシュ」とも呼ぶべき中韓歴訪によって、小泉政権から引き継いだ最大の負の遺産＝アジア外交の行き詰まり＝を一気に清算したばかりでなく、新政権そのものの基盤を安定させる効果も大きかった。
「戦後生まれで初、戦後では最年少」と若さを強調し、「闘う政治家」の気負いを見せた首相が、外交の場では意外に手堅い柔軟さを発揮した。それ以上に小泉時代の日中両国は相互に反発、不信を繰り返しながら、それぞれの内部で問題点の認識、反省が進み、小泉退陣の際は必ず局面を打開しよう、との機運が生まれていたことが重要だ。
安倍は５年半の小泉政権下で前首相に寵愛されて急速に政治基盤を固め、強力な小泉支持勢力に支えられて順調に政権を握った。従って前政権の政策を全面継承するのが自然だが、小泉のアジア外交は失敗との評価が内外で定着していたから、安倍は小泉が最後まで固執した「公約」の靖国参拝を継承せず、自身の靖国参拝については一切公言しない「曖昧戦術」へ切り替えることができた。
一方、中国側にも靖国問題を理由に首脳会談を拒み続け、対日関係を悪化に任せるのは得策でない、との考えが広がってきた。江沢民前主席は1998年の訪日で日本の歴史認識批判を繰り返すなど、反日意識をあおる傾向があったが、2003年に国家主席に就任した胡錦涛は当初から対日関係の改善を考えていたフシがある。しかし格差の拡大、政権の腐敗、環境問題の深刻化など山積する内政課題に対処する「調和社会」を唱えた胡錦涛政権は、その前提として「善隣外交」を強調したものの、根深い対日不信の解消を本気で進めるだけの権威は確立していなかった。
昨年春、中国各地に広がった反日デモは、政治の腐敗など内政に対する大衆の不満が反日の言動にはけ口を求める危険を示した。今年９月末、江沢民の地盤である上海の共産党組織のトップが汚職容疑で解任されたこと、安倍・胡会談の当日に始まった中共中央委総会が「調和社会建設の重大問題に関する決定」を採択したことは、胡錦涛の政策が浸透し始めたことを象徴し、日中関係改善の重要な背景だ。
今回、胡錦涛は『安倍は靖国に参拝しない』との心証を得ると、それ以上の「確約」を求めることなしに安倍訪中を受け入れた。会談後の日中共同プレス発表は「戦後日本の平和国家としての歩み」を積極的に評価し、エネルギー、環境保護、金融、情報通信技術、知的財産保護等を日中互恵協力の重点項目として明記し、北朝鮮の核実験に「深い憂慮」を表明、朝鮮半島の非核化の実現、北東アジアの平和と安定維持のための日中協力を表明した。胡錦涛の日中関係への期待を素直に表現したものだ。
北朝鮮の核実験は、北東アジア情勢の深刻さを浮き彫りにし、日中首脳会談に劇的な彩りを添えた。これまで一貫して北朝鮮を擁護する態度をとってきた中国が初めて北朝鮮を公然と批判し、国連の制裁決議に賛成した。北朝鮮は核保有の意欲も中国への不満も隠していない。中国の「善隣外交」はなお大きな試練にさらされている。
日中は協力してこの事態に対処することになったが、北朝鮮に対する両国の利害関係、隣人意識には大きな差が残ったままだ。安倍首相は早くから拉致問題に関心を集中、内閣に特殊の布陣もしいた。より広く複雑な視点から朝鮮情勢に対処せざるを得ない中国とどう歩調を合わせて行くか、再出発した日中関係の大きな試金石になるだろう。
（筆者は元共同通信論説委員長）
一般社団法人 日本英語交流連盟