The Constitutional Amendment Procedure Law and the Abe Administration
FUKUHARA Koichi / Journalist
May 23, 2007
The Constitutional Amendment Procedure Law (the National Referendum Law) was enacted on May 14, 2007. For the first time since the enforcement of the current constitution sixty years ago, a law for constitutional amendment procedure has come into law as the first step toward an amendment of the constitution. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's wish to make constitutional amendments an issue at the coming House of Councilors' elections has been realized.
Mr. Abe quickly reopened Japan's deadlocked relations with China and Korea, caused by former Premier Koizumi's controversial visits to Yasukuni shrine, by choosing China and Korea for a visit soon after assuming the reins of government. Since then, Abe's foreign policy has attracted much internal and external attention. Now that the main theme of internal politics has been set, a total picture of the Abe administration has taken shape, however dim it may be.
Though it is praised as the first historical step towards a constitutional amendment in some quarters, the Prime Minister does not seem to be enjoying great appreciation or the confidence of the people for his ability. This is because no clear image of constitutional amendments pursued by Abe has struck a cord with the people, notwithstanding the Prime Minister's brilliant slogans like "making Japan a beautiful country," or "breakaway from the post-war regime," etc., because they are vague and abstract.
At a press conference in January, Prime Minister Abe announced his intention to make constitutional amendments an issue in the summer elections and hammered out the three-party understanding already reached among the persons in charge from the Liberal Democratic, Komei (Clean Government) and Democratic parties that "the procedure bill should be made without party interests." Thus the procedure law was successfully but forcibly enacted and in terms of procedural matters, progress has been made. However, as it requires a two-thirds majority in the Diet when it comes to constitutional amendments, actual amendments could be said to be further away.
Declaring himself "a fighting politician," Abe may be considering that the first thing to do is to increase the strength of supporters of constitutional revision through elections, leaving the contents of amendments until later while using ambiguous slogans in the meantime.
The Abe administration is determined to enact, during the current Diet session, in addition to the constitutional amendment procedure law, such important bills as the National Security Council bill, the Education Reform bill, the Civil Service System Reform bill, and other major bills related to the redeployment of U.S. troops in Japan. However, as there are many other issues which the people are very much concerned with, Abe's expectation to make the LDP advantageous in the elections by taking up the constitutional amendment issue may not necessarily be met.
By the same token, Abe's diplomacy, highly applauded for its bright launch at the outset last year, gives no ground for optimism, if the Prime Minister continues to depend on "ambiguous tactics" and fails as the leader to account fully for his policies. Mr. Wen Jiabao, who came to visit Japan in April for the first time in six and a half years as the Chinese Premier, impressed the Japanese with China's enthusiasm for the improvement of relations with Japan by his accommodating behavior. During his 35-minute speech at the Diet, Wen clearly appreciated that the Japanese government and political leaders had expressed their reflections on and apologies for the past aggressive war against China. He also appraised Japan's cooperation with China's economic development during their "open and reform" period. His address was broadcast live in China and played an important role in impressing on the Chinese the importance of Sino-Japanese cooperation.
While Premier Wen unstintingly praised Prime Minister Abe for his efforts to make a breakthrough for the betterment of relations between the two countries, he showed some wariness about Abe's "ambiguous tactics" regarding Yasukuni shrine and reiterated his request to hold future visits to Yasukuni in check. Although China's media in general refrained from criticizing Japan and tried to report objectively, they did not conceal their deep-rooted distrust of Japan, centering around the fact that Abe had expressed his intention to "act together as partners" at the NATO Council in January, for which the Japan-U.S. military integration is being made ready for future contingencies in the Taiwan Strait, and various statements made by Premier Abe and Foreign Minister Taro Aso about "the value sharing league"of Japan, the U.S., Australia and India as well as "the arc of freedom and prosperity" in the Eurasian region. Aren't these happenings, they question, contrary to the promise with China to build a"strategic relationship for mutual benefit"?
In the wake of Wen's return to China, Premier Abe made an offering (a potted sakaki plant) to Yasukuni in the Prime Minister's name at the shrine's annual festival and, as with the case of visits, refused to make any explanation or comment, creating suspicion and fear in the minds of the Chinese.
The hardest blow to Abe's diplomacy is the defeat of the Republican Party in the mid-term election in the United States last November and the consequent fall of the Bush administration's prestige. President Bush has not yielded to the Democrats' demand to reveal a pullout plan from Iraq to Congress, keeping a strong posture and threatening to veto any such move. In order to concentrate on the Middle East, including the containment of Iran's nuclear development, however, the United States has already been obliged to compromise with North Korea at the six-party talks on nuclear issues. As she agreed to direct negotiations with North Korea, and eased financial sanctions, the U.S. made a sorry display of internal confusion within the government. Thus the official policy of the Abe administration to solve the abduction issue by forming an international network including the U.S. and China and applying more pressure on North Korea has apparently failed.
Abe's statement about the "comfort women" issue that "no evidence has been found to prove that the Japanese authorities were responsible, in a strict sense of the word, of coercion" was met with unexpected repercussions from the American Congress which Abe found himself busy explaining. Because of the decline of the Bush administration's prestige, there can be no room for Abe to enjoy the fruits of the solidarity of the U.S.-Japan alliance in such a way as was possible in the Koizumi Cabinet days.
The Writer is former Chief Editorial Writer of Kyodo News Agency.
Mr. Abe quickly reopened Japan's deadlocked relations with China and Korea, caused by former Premier Koizumi's controversial visits to Yasukuni shrine, by choosing China and Korea for a visit soon after assuming the reins of government. Since then, Abe's foreign policy has attracted much internal and external attention. Now that the main theme of internal politics has been set, a total picture of the Abe administration has taken shape, however dim it may be.
Though it is praised as the first historical step towards a constitutional amendment in some quarters, the Prime Minister does not seem to be enjoying great appreciation or the confidence of the people for his ability. This is because no clear image of constitutional amendments pursued by Abe has struck a cord with the people, notwithstanding the Prime Minister's brilliant slogans like "making Japan a beautiful country," or "breakaway from the post-war regime," etc., because they are vague and abstract.
At a press conference in January, Prime Minister Abe announced his intention to make constitutional amendments an issue in the summer elections and hammered out the three-party understanding already reached among the persons in charge from the Liberal Democratic, Komei (Clean Government) and Democratic parties that "the procedure bill should be made without party interests." Thus the procedure law was successfully but forcibly enacted and in terms of procedural matters, progress has been made. However, as it requires a two-thirds majority in the Diet when it comes to constitutional amendments, actual amendments could be said to be further away.
Declaring himself "a fighting politician," Abe may be considering that the first thing to do is to increase the strength of supporters of constitutional revision through elections, leaving the contents of amendments until later while using ambiguous slogans in the meantime.
The Abe administration is determined to enact, during the current Diet session, in addition to the constitutional amendment procedure law, such important bills as the National Security Council bill, the Education Reform bill, the Civil Service System Reform bill, and other major bills related to the redeployment of U.S. troops in Japan. However, as there are many other issues which the people are very much concerned with, Abe's expectation to make the LDP advantageous in the elections by taking up the constitutional amendment issue may not necessarily be met.
By the same token, Abe's diplomacy, highly applauded for its bright launch at the outset last year, gives no ground for optimism, if the Prime Minister continues to depend on "ambiguous tactics" and fails as the leader to account fully for his policies. Mr. Wen Jiabao, who came to visit Japan in April for the first time in six and a half years as the Chinese Premier, impressed the Japanese with China's enthusiasm for the improvement of relations with Japan by his accommodating behavior. During his 35-minute speech at the Diet, Wen clearly appreciated that the Japanese government and political leaders had expressed their reflections on and apologies for the past aggressive war against China. He also appraised Japan's cooperation with China's economic development during their "open and reform" period. His address was broadcast live in China and played an important role in impressing on the Chinese the importance of Sino-Japanese cooperation.
While Premier Wen unstintingly praised Prime Minister Abe for his efforts to make a breakthrough for the betterment of relations between the two countries, he showed some wariness about Abe's "ambiguous tactics" regarding Yasukuni shrine and reiterated his request to hold future visits to Yasukuni in check. Although China's media in general refrained from criticizing Japan and tried to report objectively, they did not conceal their deep-rooted distrust of Japan, centering around the fact that Abe had expressed his intention to "act together as partners" at the NATO Council in January, for which the Japan-U.S. military integration is being made ready for future contingencies in the Taiwan Strait, and various statements made by Premier Abe and Foreign Minister Taro Aso about "the value sharing league"of Japan, the U.S., Australia and India as well as "the arc of freedom and prosperity" in the Eurasian region. Aren't these happenings, they question, contrary to the promise with China to build a"strategic relationship for mutual benefit"?
In the wake of Wen's return to China, Premier Abe made an offering (a potted sakaki plant) to Yasukuni in the Prime Minister's name at the shrine's annual festival and, as with the case of visits, refused to make any explanation or comment, creating suspicion and fear in the minds of the Chinese.
The hardest blow to Abe's diplomacy is the defeat of the Republican Party in the mid-term election in the United States last November and the consequent fall of the Bush administration's prestige. President Bush has not yielded to the Democrats' demand to reveal a pullout plan from Iraq to Congress, keeping a strong posture and threatening to veto any such move. In order to concentrate on the Middle East, including the containment of Iran's nuclear development, however, the United States has already been obliged to compromise with North Korea at the six-party talks on nuclear issues. As she agreed to direct negotiations with North Korea, and eased financial sanctions, the U.S. made a sorry display of internal confusion within the government. Thus the official policy of the Abe administration to solve the abduction issue by forming an international network including the U.S. and China and applying more pressure on North Korea has apparently failed.
Abe's statement about the "comfort women" issue that "no evidence has been found to prove that the Japanese authorities were responsible, in a strict sense of the word, of coercion" was met with unexpected repercussions from the American Congress which Abe found himself busy explaining. Because of the decline of the Bush administration's prestige, there can be no room for Abe to enjoy the fruits of the solidarity of the U.S.-Japan alliance in such a way as was possible in the Koizumi Cabinet days.
The Writer is former Chief Editorial Writer of Kyodo News Agency.
The English-Speaking Union of Japan
改憲手続き法に表われた安倍政治
福原 亨一 / ジャーナリスト
2007年 5月 23日
憲法改正手続き法（国民投票法）が14日に成立した。現行憲法が施行されて60年後に初めて憲法改正の手順が決まり，改正への第一歩が踏み出された。夏の参院選挙は憲法改正を争点にしたい，という安倍首相の執念が実を結んだ。
安倍首相は昨年10月、就任直後に中国、韓国を訪問し、小泉前首相の靖国神社参拝で行き詰まった両国との関係を一挙に打開した。それ以来、外交面で内外の注目を集めることが多かったが、ようやく内政面の柱となる実績が築かれ，安倍政策の全体像がおぼろげに浮かんで来た。
しかし改憲への歴史的一歩とうたわれるほどには、首相の手腕に高い評価と信頼が寄せられているようには見えない。それは「美しい国つくり」「戦後レジームからの脱却」など首相の掛け声が抽象的で，首相の目指す憲法改正の具体的なイメージが十分に説明されていないためだ。
首相は１月の記者会見で憲法改正を夏の参院選の争点にする意向を示し，それまで自民，民主，公明三党の担当者間で積み上げて来た「党利党略抜きで手続き法を作ろう」という努力をぶちこわした。今回の手続き法の成立強行はその延長であり，確かに改憲の手続きは一歩進んだが，改憲発議には国会の三分の二の賛成が必要なことを考えると，実際の改憲はむしろ遠のいた、との見方も可能だ。
「闘う政治家」を自称する首相は，改正の内容は後回しで、曖昧なスローガンのままで選挙を戦い，改憲勢力の拡大を急ぐのが先決と考えるのだろう。
安倍政権は、改憲手続き法のほかにも安全保障会議設置、教育改革、公務員制度改革、在日米軍再編関連などの重要法案を今国会で成立させる，としている。国民が憲法以上に深い関心を寄せる課題も多いので，憲法改正を争点にすれば自民有利とする首相の思惑が当たるとは限らない。
肝心な点で曖昧戦術に頼り、指導者としての説明責任を十分に果たしていないという意味では、昨年あざやかな出足で賞賛を浴びた安倍外交も手放しで楽観はできない。４月に中国首相として六年半ぶりに温家宝が来日，ソフトな物腰で対日関係の改善を求める中国の熱意を売り込んだ。35分間の国会演説は、日本の政府・指導者が対中侵略戦争の反省とおわびを表明し、改革・開放時代の中国の経済発展にも協力した、とはっきり評価した。演説は中国で中継放映され、対日協調の重要性を中国民に訴える役割も果たした。
温首相は関係改善の突破口を開いた安倍首相への賛辞を惜しまなかったが、靖国参拝について明言しない首相の「曖昧戦術」に警戒を緩めず、今後の参拝を牽制する発言を執拗に繰り返した。中国のメディアは対日批判を控えながらも、安倍首相が１月のNATO理事会で『パートナーとして共に行動する』意向を表明したこと、日米軍事一体化を進め、台湾海峡に関与する態勢であること、首相と麻生外相が日米豪印の“価値観を同じくする連盟”やユーラシアの“自由と繁栄の弧”を積極的に宣伝していること、などに注目、中国と「戦略的互恵関係」を築こうという約束にそぐわない姿勢ではないか，との不満をにじませている。
安倍首相は温家宝の帰国直後、靖国神社の例大祭に首相名義で供え物（サカキの鉢植え）を奉納したが，参拝についてと同様，一切の説明を拒んでおり，中国の疑心暗鬼を深めたことは否定できない。
安倍外交への最大の打撃は、昨年11月の米中間選挙で共和党が敗北し、ブッシュ政権の威信が低下したことだ。ブッシュ大統領はイラクからの撤兵プランを示せという議会民主党の要求を拒否権で退ける強い姿勢を崩していない。しかしイランの核開発封じ込めを含む中東問題に力を集中するため、北朝鮮の核をめぐる六者協議では既に妥協を余儀なくされ、北との直接協議に応じて金融制裁をゆるめるなど、米政権内部の混乱を露呈する醜態を演じている。「米国、中国を含む国際包囲網で北への制裁を強化し拉致問題の解決を図るという安倍政権の看板政策は次第に展望を失いつつある。
安倍首相は従軍慰安婦問題で「日本当局が慰安婦を強制した狭義の責任を裏付ける証拠はない」と発言し，米議会から予想外の強烈な反発を浴びて釈明に追われた。ブッシュ政権の権威が失墜し、強い結束をうたう日米同盟も小泉政権時代のような甘えは許されない時代になった。
（筆者は元共同通信論説委員。）
安倍首相は昨年10月、就任直後に中国、韓国を訪問し、小泉前首相の靖国神社参拝で行き詰まった両国との関係を一挙に打開した。それ以来、外交面で内外の注目を集めることが多かったが、ようやく内政面の柱となる実績が築かれ，安倍政策の全体像がおぼろげに浮かんで来た。
しかし改憲への歴史的一歩とうたわれるほどには、首相の手腕に高い評価と信頼が寄せられているようには見えない。それは「美しい国つくり」「戦後レジームからの脱却」など首相の掛け声が抽象的で，首相の目指す憲法改正の具体的なイメージが十分に説明されていないためだ。
首相は１月の記者会見で憲法改正を夏の参院選の争点にする意向を示し，それまで自民，民主，公明三党の担当者間で積み上げて来た「党利党略抜きで手続き法を作ろう」という努力をぶちこわした。今回の手続き法の成立強行はその延長であり，確かに改憲の手続きは一歩進んだが，改憲発議には国会の三分の二の賛成が必要なことを考えると，実際の改憲はむしろ遠のいた、との見方も可能だ。
「闘う政治家」を自称する首相は，改正の内容は後回しで、曖昧なスローガンのままで選挙を戦い，改憲勢力の拡大を急ぐのが先決と考えるのだろう。
安倍政権は、改憲手続き法のほかにも安全保障会議設置、教育改革、公務員制度改革、在日米軍再編関連などの重要法案を今国会で成立させる，としている。国民が憲法以上に深い関心を寄せる課題も多いので，憲法改正を争点にすれば自民有利とする首相の思惑が当たるとは限らない。
肝心な点で曖昧戦術に頼り、指導者としての説明責任を十分に果たしていないという意味では、昨年あざやかな出足で賞賛を浴びた安倍外交も手放しで楽観はできない。４月に中国首相として六年半ぶりに温家宝が来日，ソフトな物腰で対日関係の改善を求める中国の熱意を売り込んだ。35分間の国会演説は、日本の政府・指導者が対中侵略戦争の反省とおわびを表明し、改革・開放時代の中国の経済発展にも協力した、とはっきり評価した。演説は中国で中継放映され、対日協調の重要性を中国民に訴える役割も果たした。
温首相は関係改善の突破口を開いた安倍首相への賛辞を惜しまなかったが、靖国参拝について明言しない首相の「曖昧戦術」に警戒を緩めず、今後の参拝を牽制する発言を執拗に繰り返した。中国のメディアは対日批判を控えながらも、安倍首相が１月のNATO理事会で『パートナーとして共に行動する』意向を表明したこと、日米軍事一体化を進め、台湾海峡に関与する態勢であること、首相と麻生外相が日米豪印の“価値観を同じくする連盟”やユーラシアの“自由と繁栄の弧”を積極的に宣伝していること、などに注目、中国と「戦略的互恵関係」を築こうという約束にそぐわない姿勢ではないか，との不満をにじませている。
安倍首相は温家宝の帰国直後、靖国神社の例大祭に首相名義で供え物（サカキの鉢植え）を奉納したが，参拝についてと同様，一切の説明を拒んでおり，中国の疑心暗鬼を深めたことは否定できない。
安倍外交への最大の打撃は、昨年11月の米中間選挙で共和党が敗北し、ブッシュ政権の威信が低下したことだ。ブッシュ大統領はイラクからの撤兵プランを示せという議会民主党の要求を拒否権で退ける強い姿勢を崩していない。しかしイランの核開発封じ込めを含む中東問題に力を集中するため、北朝鮮の核をめぐる六者協議では既に妥協を余儀なくされ、北との直接協議に応じて金融制裁をゆるめるなど、米政権内部の混乱を露呈する醜態を演じている。「米国、中国を含む国際包囲網で北への制裁を強化し拉致問題の解決を図るという安倍政権の看板政策は次第に展望を失いつつある。
安倍首相は従軍慰安婦問題で「日本当局が慰安婦を強制した狭義の責任を裏付ける証拠はない」と発言し，米議会から予想外の強烈な反発を浴びて釈明に追われた。ブッシュ政権の権威が失墜し、強い結束をうたう日米同盟も小泉政権時代のような甘えは許されない時代になった。
（筆者は元共同通信論説委員。）
一般社団法人 日本英語交流連盟