Japan in Their Own Words (JITOW)/日本からの意見

Our Only Option – Concluding a "Big Deal" with General Secretary Kim While in Power
HIRAI Hisashi / Journalist

September 9, 2009
North Korea has reversed course from its hard-line approach of provoking the international community with nuclear tests and missile launches to a strategy calling for a dialogue with the United States and South Korea.

It began with a drive towards the United States. On August 4, General Secretary Kim Jong-Il met with former U.S. President Bill Clinton, who had paid a visit seeking the release of two U.S. reporters detained by North Korea. While details have not been disclosed, there is a strong possibility that General Secretary Kim made a proposal of sorts to President Barack Obama through Clinton.

The next target was the South Korean public. General Secretary Kim met with Hyundai Group Chairman Hyon・Jongun, , who had also traveled to North Korea. Talking as much time as he wanted before making his appearance, General Secretary Kim finally met Chairman Hyon and demonstrated flexibility by granting him his wishes. Prior to this meeting, North Korea released Hyundai Group employees it had been detaining, and afterwards announced a five-point agreement including the resumption of Mount Kumgang tourism and reunion of separated families.

It was at this point in time that on August 18, former South Korean President Kim Daejung passed away. General Secretary Kim immediately dispatched a delegation to the funeral, which included Secretary Kim・Ginam and United Front Department Director Kim・Yanhggon of the Workers Party of North Korea. The delegation met with South Korea's President Lee Myunbak on August 23 and delivered a verbal message of condolences from General Secretary Kim. The message is said to have been about progress in South-North cooperation. And from this point on, North Korea suspended its campaign of branding President Lee a "traitor."

Why has North Korea suddenly changed course from a hard-line approach to a dialogue strategy?

The first reason lies in the recovery of General Secretary Kim's health. While we do not know whether the recovery is only temporary or otherwise, the current dialogue strategy is unmistakably being led by the recovered leader.

In a dictatorship such as North Korea, when the top man falls ill and political decision-making is delegated to his aides, they often adopt a hard-line approach in part to protect themselves. Orchestrating a flexible approach requires powerful leadership that allows for compromise. And in today's North Korea, General Secretary Kim is the only person who can do this.

The second reason is that having accomplished a certain level of military success with the nuclear tests and missile launches, the path towards succession by third son Kim Jong-un can now be reasonably considered a fait accompli, and this in turn required a breakthrough in North Korea's foreign affairs.

The third reason is North Korea's need to show economic results that will directly benefit its people so that the country can "fling open the gate to a thriving nation" in 2012, the year commemorating the 100th birthday of General Secretary Kim Il-sung. While North Korea is currently engaged in a "150-day struggle" through mass participation, it will need cash income from South Korea and economic aid from China to improve the lives of its people. To pave the way towards such an environment, North Korea had no choice but to move towards a dialogue.

Sanctions by the U.N. Security Council will be effective to a certain extent against arms exports and illegal transfer of funds. However, China is the only country that can affect North Korea through general commerce. At present, North Korea can only be moved through dialogue with the United States and covert pressure from China.

The United States remains circumspect, and steadfastly maintains its position of offering the possibility of a dialogue only within the framework of the six-party talks if North Korea moves towards disposing its nuclear weapons. South Korea also remains committed to its stance of seeking denuclearization, though it is expected to accept the resumption of Mount Kumgang tourism and reunion of separated families.

It is easy to criticize the dictatorship under General Secretary Kim. However, once he disappears as a leader, North Korea will revert to a hard-line approach to safeguard its government. General Secretary Kim is our only counterpart in negotiating a comprehensive resolution for the missile control and abduction issues. The question does not concern the merits or demerits of the man himself. Without General Secretary Kim, North Korea will have no leader who can carry off a considerable deal with the international community.

The international community must become keenly aware of North Korea's need to reconstruct its economy by 2012, and must secure a "big deal" that leads to a comprehensive resolution of the nuclear arms, missiles and abductions issues, normalization of relations with Japan and the United States, and the establishment of a framework for peace on the Korean Peninsula, while General Secretary Kim is still in power.

To do so, the United States must open talks with North Korea. The idea of three-party talks involving the United States, China and North Korea may also surface as a step towards resumption of the six-party talks.

Unfortunately, Japan has no part to play in the current situation. The key lies in whether the new administration formed by the Democratic Party following the general elections will be able to separate the abduction issue from the nuclear weapons and missile issue. Japan will have little to contribute in terms of diplomacy and security as long as it maintains the stance of subjugating its entire North Korean policy to the abduction issue. For the sake of progress in this area alone, Japan must meet head-on with North Korea to discuss the abduction issue.

The writer is Senior Editor of Kyodo News Agency.
The English-Speaking Union of Japan




健在な金総書記とのビックディールしかない
平井久志 / ジャーナリスト

2009年 9月 9日
北朝鮮が核実験やミサイル発射などで国際社会を挑発する強硬路線から一転、米国や韓国へ対話を呼び掛ける対話路線に転換を始めた。

最初は対米攻勢だった。金正日総書記は8月4日に北朝鮮に拘束されていた女性米人記者二人を解放するために訪朝したクリントン元米大統領と会談した。詳細は明らかにされていないが、金総書記がクリントン元大統領を通じてオバマ米大統領に何らかの提案を行った可能性が強い。

次のターゲットは韓国の民間だった。金正日総書記は訪朝していた韓国の玄貞恩(hyon・jongun)現代グループ会長と会談。金総書記は玄会長をさんざん待たせたあげく「願いごとは何でも言って下さい」と柔軟勢を示した。北朝鮮は、この会談に先立って拘束していた現代グループの職員を解放し、会談後には金剛山観光の再開や離散家族の再開など五項目の合意を発表した。

そういうタイミングで、韓国の金大中元大統領が8月18日に死去した。金正日総書記はすぐに金己男(kim・ginam)党書記、金養建(kim・yanhggon)党統一戦線部長らの弔問団をソウルへ派遣。同弔問団は同23日に李明博大統領と会談し、金総書記の口頭メッセージを伝達した。メッセージは「南北協力の進展」に関するものだったという。北朝鮮はこれ以降、李明博大統領への「逆徒」というキャンペーンを中止した。

北朝鮮が急に強硬路線から対話攻勢へ路線を転換したのはなぜだろう。第一は金総書記の健康の回復だ。この健康回復が一時的なものかどうかは不明だが、現在の対話攻勢が健康を回復した金総書記の主導であることは間違いない。

北朝鮮のような独裁国家で、トップの健康が損なわれ、政治判断が側近に委任されると、側近たちの判断は自分自身の保身もあり、強硬政策に傾く。柔軟路線を演出し、譲歩するには強いリーダーシップが必要だ。現在の北朝鮮でそれができるのは金正日総書記しかいない。

第二は、北朝鮮が核実験やミサイル発射で一定の軍事的な目標を達成し、三男、金正雲氏への後継体制への道をある程度は既成事実化し、対外的な状況打開に向かう必要があった。

第三は金日成主席の生誕百周年である2012年に「強盛大国の大門を開ける」ためには、住民の生活に直結する経済的な成果をあげなければならない。北朝鮮は大衆動員方式の「百五十日戦闘」を行っているが、住民の生活向上のためには韓国からの現金収入や経済支援、中国の支援が必要だ。その環境を整えるためには対話に向かうしかなかった。

国連安全保障理事会の制裁措置は武器輸出規制や不正な金融取引には一定の効果があるだろうが、一般貿易で北朝鮮に影響を与えるのは中国しかない。

現在の北朝鮮を本当に動かすのは米国の対話と、中国の密かな圧力だ。

米国はまだ慎重な姿勢で、米朝対話は北朝鮮が核廃棄の方向に向かい六カ国協議の枠内でなら可能という立場を堅持している。韓国も核の廃棄を求める姿勢を堅持しているが、金剛山観光再開や離散家族再開は受け入れるだろう。

金正日総書記の独裁を非難することは容易だ。しかし、金正日総書記という指導者が不在になれば、北朝鮮は政権維持のために再び強硬路線に戻るであろう。核廃棄、ミサイル統制、拉致問題解決という包括的な解決の交渉相手は金正日総書記しかいない。金正日総書記の善悪ではなく、金総書記が不在な状況では、北朝鮮に国際社会と大きな取引ができる指導者はいない。

国際社会は二〇一二年までの、北朝鮮が経済再建の必要性を痛感し、金総書記が健在な間に、核・ミサイル・拉致の包括的解決と日米との国交正常化、朝鮮半島の平和体制構築という「ビックディール」を実現しなければならない。

そのためには米国は北朝鮮と対話するしかない。六カ国協議へ向かうステップとしての米中朝の三者協議などが浮上するかもしれない。

残念ながら、現状では日本の役割はない。総選挙後の、おそらくは民主党中心の新政権が拉致問題と核・ミサイル問題を切り離すことができるかどうかがポイントだろう。北朝鮮政策のすべてを拉致問題に従属させる姿勢を続けるなら、外交・安保面での日本の役割はほとんどない。拉致問題の進展のためにも、この問題は日朝協議の場で正面から協議しなくてはならない。

(筆者は共同通信編集委員。)
一般社団法人 日本英語交流連盟


English Speaking Union of Japan > Japan in Their Own Words (JITOW) > Our Only Option – Concluding a "Big Deal" with General Secretary Kim While in Power