Japan's Commercial-Industrial Sector Poses Greater Obstacle to Trade Liberalization than the Agricultural Sector
GODO Yoshihisa / Professor, Meiji Gakuin University
September 7, 2011
In Japan, the commercial-industrial sector poses a greater obstacle to trade liberalization than the agricultural sector – such is my analysis, and many readers will no doubt be surprised. For many years, whenever the discussion turned to liberalizing trade, the typical equation depicted the agricultural sector as the opponent and the commercial-industrial sector the proponent of liberalization. This was particularly the case during the Uruguay Round talks that took place towards the end of the 1980's and through the early 1990's. The agricultural sector represented by the Japan Agricultural Cooperatives (JA) opposed liberalization fearing an influx of cheap agricultural imports. Meanwhile, the commercial-industrial sector represented by the Keidanren (Japan Business Federation) and Doyukai (Japan Association of Corporate Executives) supported liberalization as they sought new avenues of growth through exports. This led to a fierce debate between the two camps. That image seems to have stuck in people’s minds, and there are still many who believe that progress in liberalization would come if we could only silence the JA.
Nearly two decades have passed since the Uruguay Round talks, yet Japanese agriculture remains weak in international competition. Therefore, JA officials will continue to voice their opposition to liberalization when confronted by a microphone. However, JA no longer has the political clout it wielded in the past.
In the past, a formidable bond existed between the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, the JA and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). But the series of electoral reforms including the introduction of the single-seat constituency system eroded JA's influence. Its organizational clout has diminished considerably over the past few years as the LDP left its seat of power and the Lehman Shock dealt a direct blow to JA's financial operations.
Though we make casual reference to "farmers" only a handful of them actually work the land full-time. Such farmers, anticipating the coming era of trade liberalization, have already taken measures such as raising quality to differentiate their products. Meanwhile, micro-farmers who make up the majority have secured other means of earning a stable income, and are no longer dependent on agriculture. Thus, when farmers and the JA express their opposition to trade liberalization, they only do so half-heartedly. For the most part, their real motive seems to be to elicit as much government funding as possible by showing their resistance.
Likewise, although the commercial-industrial sector publicly seeks liberalization, it does so without the intensity of the past. The Upper House election in 2009 was symbolic of this change. The Democratic Party of Japan, which had been in favor of Free Trade Agreements (FTA) until then, adopted a passive posture to win votes from farmers. Yet the move evoked a muted reaction from the commercial-industrial sector, which offered only a token objection.
The level of global aspirations differs among companies in the commercial-industrial sector. Companies with a strong global orientation have already moved away from Japan by transferring their manufacturing bases overseas, and are less attentive to Japanese government policy on issues including trade. As a consequence, companies that depend on domestic demand that are less globally-oriented have increased their influence on political lobbying conducted by the commercial- industrial sector.
Furthermore, such commercial-industrial companies dependent on domestic demand are seeking closer collaboration with farmers and the JA. In concrete terms, such collaboration includes processing local agricultural products and developing them into local specialties and green tourism. Such efforts are known as "agri-commercial-manufacturing collaboration," or the "sixth industry" – a term coined as a slogan to signify the convergence of the primary, secondary and tertiary industries in a region, and is also explained as "1+2+3=6." The Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry are handing out subsidies to such collaboration. Today, the agricultural sector and the commercial-industrial sector have become birds of a feather, in the sense that they seek government protection as "well-meaning underdogs" striving to save local jobs.
In the days of the Uruguay Round talks, Japan's commercial-industrial sector was proud of its international competitiveness, and corporate leaders spoke of their ambitious plans for the global market. Today however, that same sector has completely lost its competitive edge in the face of vigorous challenge from emerging countries such as India and China. No longer able to entertain their global reverie, some Japanese business leaders have instead turned to the nostalgic dream of taking up farming. Such is the background of the current "agriculture boom," in which active moves are being made to launch agribusinesses on the strength of abundant cash, such as building vegetable factories or acquiring vast farmlands in Hokkaido, the northernmost prefecture. And this trend further encourages parallel thinking between the commercial-industrial and agricultural sectors.
Of course, there are those who call for trade liberalization within the commercial-industrial sector. There is also concern that any careless comment giving off the impression of being less than enthusiastic about liberalization might invite suspicion from the general public that the commercial-industrial sector has become spineless. This is preventing the commercial-industrial sector from articulating its stance on trade liberalization. Its safest strategy is to refrain from becoming actively involved in trade policy and, when confronted by a microphone, to pass the buck to the agricultural sector, blaming opposition from that sector for the lack of progress on liberalization.
In effect, the commercial-industrial sector has become passive on the subject. This is tantamount to turning its back on the issue and risks causing a further contraction in the Japanese economy. During the Uruguay Round talks, the agricultural sector was vociferous in its opposition to trade liberalization, which made the equation simple enough. Today, the hazy maneuverings of the commercial-industrial sector has made the issue that much more complicated to resolve.
The writer is Professor of Economics at Meiji Gakuin University.
Nearly two decades have passed since the Uruguay Round talks, yet Japanese agriculture remains weak in international competition. Therefore, JA officials will continue to voice their opposition to liberalization when confronted by a microphone. However, JA no longer has the political clout it wielded in the past.
In the past, a formidable bond existed between the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, the JA and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). But the series of electoral reforms including the introduction of the single-seat constituency system eroded JA's influence. Its organizational clout has diminished considerably over the past few years as the LDP left its seat of power and the Lehman Shock dealt a direct blow to JA's financial operations.
Though we make casual reference to "farmers" only a handful of them actually work the land full-time. Such farmers, anticipating the coming era of trade liberalization, have already taken measures such as raising quality to differentiate their products. Meanwhile, micro-farmers who make up the majority have secured other means of earning a stable income, and are no longer dependent on agriculture. Thus, when farmers and the JA express their opposition to trade liberalization, they only do so half-heartedly. For the most part, their real motive seems to be to elicit as much government funding as possible by showing their resistance.
Likewise, although the commercial-industrial sector publicly seeks liberalization, it does so without the intensity of the past. The Upper House election in 2009 was symbolic of this change. The Democratic Party of Japan, which had been in favor of Free Trade Agreements (FTA) until then, adopted a passive posture to win votes from farmers. Yet the move evoked a muted reaction from the commercial-industrial sector, which offered only a token objection.
The level of global aspirations differs among companies in the commercial-industrial sector. Companies with a strong global orientation have already moved away from Japan by transferring their manufacturing bases overseas, and are less attentive to Japanese government policy on issues including trade. As a consequence, companies that depend on domestic demand that are less globally-oriented have increased their influence on political lobbying conducted by the commercial- industrial sector.
Furthermore, such commercial-industrial companies dependent on domestic demand are seeking closer collaboration with farmers and the JA. In concrete terms, such collaboration includes processing local agricultural products and developing them into local specialties and green tourism. Such efforts are known as "agri-commercial-manufacturing collaboration," or the "sixth industry" – a term coined as a slogan to signify the convergence of the primary, secondary and tertiary industries in a region, and is also explained as "1+2+3=6." The Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry are handing out subsidies to such collaboration. Today, the agricultural sector and the commercial-industrial sector have become birds of a feather, in the sense that they seek government protection as "well-meaning underdogs" striving to save local jobs.
In the days of the Uruguay Round talks, Japan's commercial-industrial sector was proud of its international competitiveness, and corporate leaders spoke of their ambitious plans for the global market. Today however, that same sector has completely lost its competitive edge in the face of vigorous challenge from emerging countries such as India and China. No longer able to entertain their global reverie, some Japanese business leaders have instead turned to the nostalgic dream of taking up farming. Such is the background of the current "agriculture boom," in which active moves are being made to launch agribusinesses on the strength of abundant cash, such as building vegetable factories or acquiring vast farmlands in Hokkaido, the northernmost prefecture. And this trend further encourages parallel thinking between the commercial-industrial and agricultural sectors.
Of course, there are those who call for trade liberalization within the commercial-industrial sector. There is also concern that any careless comment giving off the impression of being less than enthusiastic about liberalization might invite suspicion from the general public that the commercial-industrial sector has become spineless. This is preventing the commercial-industrial sector from articulating its stance on trade liberalization. Its safest strategy is to refrain from becoming actively involved in trade policy and, when confronted by a microphone, to pass the buck to the agricultural sector, blaming opposition from that sector for the lack of progress on liberalization.
In effect, the commercial-industrial sector has become passive on the subject. This is tantamount to turning its back on the issue and risks causing a further contraction in the Japanese economy. During the Uruguay Round talks, the agricultural sector was vociferous in its opposition to trade liberalization, which made the equation simple enough. Today, the hazy maneuverings of the commercial-industrial sector has made the issue that much more complicated to resolve.
The writer is Professor of Economics at Meiji Gakuin University.
The English-Speaking Union of Japan
貿易自由化の障害は農業界ではなく商工界
神門善久 / 明治学院大学教授
2011年 9月 7日
「貿易自由化の障害は農業界ではなく商工界」、そういう私の見立てを聞くと、驚く読者が多いかもしれない。長らく、貿易自由化が論題に上がるたびに「自由化に反対する農業界vs.自由化に賛成する商工界」という図式が使われてきた。とくに、1980年代末から90年代初頭にかけてのウルグアイ･ラウンド交渉では、JA(農協)に代表される農業界が安価な海外産農産物流入を怖れて貿易自由化に反対し、輸出に活路を見出したい経団連・経済同友会に代表される商工界が貿易自由化を賛成し、両者が激しい論戦を繰り広げてきた。そのときのイメージが強いのか、いまだに、JAさえ封じ込めれば、貿易自由化が進展するかのように思われがちである。
ウルグアイ・ラウンド交渉からおおよそ20年を経た今日でも、日本農業の国際競争力は弱い。したがって、JA関係者にマイクを向ければ、いまでも貿易自由化反対を言う。しかし、いまのJAには、かつての政治力がない。
かつては、農水省―JA－自民党という鉄壁の連帯があった。しかし、小選挙区選挙の導入など一連の選挙制度改革はJAの力を殺いだ。とくにここ数年は、自民党も下野し、リーマンショックがJAの金融事業を直撃し、JAの組織力は著しく消沈している。
ひとくちに農家といっても、専業的に農業に打ち込んでいる農家は一握りである。彼らは、すでに貿易自由化時代を見越して、品質向上による差別化などの手を打っている。また、多数派をしめる零細農家は農外に安定的な収入源を確保しており、いまさら農業所得への執着は弱い。農家やJAが貿易自由化反対を言っても、それは本腰が入ったものではない。抵抗する姿勢を示すことで、少しでも政府から資金を引き出せればよいというのが大方のホンネではないか。
商工界も表向きは貿易自由化の推進を言っているが、かつてのような激しさがない。象徴的なのが2009年参議院選挙である。従来、FTAに好意的であった民主党が農家票を得ようとして消極姿勢に転じた。しかし、それに対する商工界の反応は鈍く、反発するといってもいかにも形ばかりのものにとどまった。
商工界の内部にも国際志向の強弱にはばらつきがあるが、国際志向の強い企業はすでに製造拠点の海外移転を進めるなど、すでに「日本離れ」をしていて、貿易問題も含めて日本政府の動向への注視力も薄らいでいる。結果的に商工界の政治運動でも、内需頼みの国際志向の弱い企業の影響力が強まる。
そういう内需頼みの商工業者は、農家やJAとの連帯を図っている。具体的には地域の農産物を加工した特産品作りや、グリーンツーリズムなどである。これらは、「農商工連携」とか「六次産業化（地域の第一次産業、第二次産業、第三次産業を結合するという意味で、1+2+3＝６に因んだ標語）」と呼ばれ、農水省や経産省もそういう取り組みに補助金を支給している。いまや、農業界と商工界は、地域の雇用を守る「善良な弱者」として政府の保護を求めるという点で、「同じ穴の狢」と化しつつある。
ウルグアイランド交渉のころは、日本の商工界は国際競争力に自信を持っていて、日本企業のトップたちも国際市場で夢を語ることができた。しかし、いまの日本の商工界は、インドや中国をはじめとする新興国の勢いの前に、すっかり国際競争力を失っている。国際市場で夢を語れなくなった日本企業のトップたちは、その代わりにノスタルジックに農業参入で夢を語る傾向もある。それが昨今の「農業ブーム」であり、野菜工場の建設やら北海道の大農地の購入やら、オカネにモノを言わせた農業参入が活発である。こういう風潮が、ますます、商工業界と農業界の思考を類似化させる。
もちろん商工界の中には貿易自由化を求める声も残っている。また、商工界が貿易自由化に関してうっかり後ろ向きなことを言えば、商工界が腑抜けになったのではないかという国民からの不信感を招く心配もある。したがって、商工界としては貿易自由化に対する態度をはっきりできない。貿易政策について積極的な動きは控え、マイクを向けられたときは「農業界の反対があるから貿易自由化は進まない」と、矛先を農業界に向けさせるのが、商工界の無難な対応ということになる。
要するに、商工業界が「内向き」になっている。これは、一種の逃避行であり、ますます日本経済を萎縮させかねない。ウルグアイ・ラウンド交渉のときは、農業界が声高に貿易自由化反対を唱えていたので構図としては単純であった。商工業界の動きがみえにくいだけに、現在の貿易自由化問題の構図は厄介である。
（筆者は明治学院大学経済学部教授。）
ウルグアイ・ラウンド交渉からおおよそ20年を経た今日でも、日本農業の国際競争力は弱い。したがって、JA関係者にマイクを向ければ、いまでも貿易自由化反対を言う。しかし、いまのJAには、かつての政治力がない。
かつては、農水省―JA－自民党という鉄壁の連帯があった。しかし、小選挙区選挙の導入など一連の選挙制度改革はJAの力を殺いだ。とくにここ数年は、自民党も下野し、リーマンショックがJAの金融事業を直撃し、JAの組織力は著しく消沈している。
ひとくちに農家といっても、専業的に農業に打ち込んでいる農家は一握りである。彼らは、すでに貿易自由化時代を見越して、品質向上による差別化などの手を打っている。また、多数派をしめる零細農家は農外に安定的な収入源を確保しており、いまさら農業所得への執着は弱い。農家やJAが貿易自由化反対を言っても、それは本腰が入ったものではない。抵抗する姿勢を示すことで、少しでも政府から資金を引き出せればよいというのが大方のホンネではないか。
商工界も表向きは貿易自由化の推進を言っているが、かつてのような激しさがない。象徴的なのが2009年参議院選挙である。従来、FTAに好意的であった民主党が農家票を得ようとして消極姿勢に転じた。しかし、それに対する商工界の反応は鈍く、反発するといってもいかにも形ばかりのものにとどまった。
商工界の内部にも国際志向の強弱にはばらつきがあるが、国際志向の強い企業はすでに製造拠点の海外移転を進めるなど、すでに「日本離れ」をしていて、貿易問題も含めて日本政府の動向への注視力も薄らいでいる。結果的に商工界の政治運動でも、内需頼みの国際志向の弱い企業の影響力が強まる。
そういう内需頼みの商工業者は、農家やJAとの連帯を図っている。具体的には地域の農産物を加工した特産品作りや、グリーンツーリズムなどである。これらは、「農商工連携」とか「六次産業化（地域の第一次産業、第二次産業、第三次産業を結合するという意味で、1+2+3＝６に因んだ標語）」と呼ばれ、農水省や経産省もそういう取り組みに補助金を支給している。いまや、農業界と商工界は、地域の雇用を守る「善良な弱者」として政府の保護を求めるという点で、「同じ穴の狢」と化しつつある。
ウルグアイランド交渉のころは、日本の商工界は国際競争力に自信を持っていて、日本企業のトップたちも国際市場で夢を語ることができた。しかし、いまの日本の商工界は、インドや中国をはじめとする新興国の勢いの前に、すっかり国際競争力を失っている。国際市場で夢を語れなくなった日本企業のトップたちは、その代わりにノスタルジックに農業参入で夢を語る傾向もある。それが昨今の「農業ブーム」であり、野菜工場の建設やら北海道の大農地の購入やら、オカネにモノを言わせた農業参入が活発である。こういう風潮が、ますます、商工業界と農業界の思考を類似化させる。
もちろん商工界の中には貿易自由化を求める声も残っている。また、商工界が貿易自由化に関してうっかり後ろ向きなことを言えば、商工界が腑抜けになったのではないかという国民からの不信感を招く心配もある。したがって、商工界としては貿易自由化に対する態度をはっきりできない。貿易政策について積極的な動きは控え、マイクを向けられたときは「農業界の反対があるから貿易自由化は進まない」と、矛先を農業界に向けさせるのが、商工界の無難な対応ということになる。
要するに、商工業界が「内向き」になっている。これは、一種の逃避行であり、ますます日本経済を萎縮させかねない。ウルグアイ・ラウンド交渉のときは、農業界が声高に貿易自由化反対を唱えていたので構図としては単純であった。商工業界の動きがみえにくいだけに、現在の貿易自由化問題の構図は厄介である。
（筆者は明治学院大学経済学部教授。）
一般社団法人 日本英語交流連盟