Japan in Their Own Words (JITOW)/日本からの意見

Would Japan go nuclear?
KAWATO Akio /  Former Japanese Ambassador to Uzbekistan and Tajikistan

September 29, 2017
North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons and missiles has ignited the debate about Japan’s nuclear armament. Pundits such as Former Secretary of State Kissinger had predicted for some time that Japan would go nuclear, arguing that one day, when abandoned by the United States, Japan would rush to arm itself with nuclear weapons. In Japan, Shigeru Ishiba, Former Minister of Defense, said on September 6th that Japan would need to review a part of its Non-Nuclear Three Principles, which pledge that Japan shall neither possess nor manufacture nuclear weapons, nor shall it permit their introduction into Japanese territory.

 Today, we need a candid, unvarnished debate on nuclear armament.

Concerning the future development on the Korean Peninsula, two broad scenarios are conceivable. One is the use of force by the United States, with China's consent, resulting in the destruction of North Korea's nuclear capabilities. The other is the resolution of the issues through dialogue. In the latter case, the focal issues will be to bring the Korean War to a formal end. That will entail the conclusion of a peace treaty, which will enable the recognition of North Korea as a sovereign state, the establishment of diplomatic relations, and the demarcation of borders. How to tackle North Korea’s nuclear weapons development will also be an important focus.

 Up to that point, Japan can remain safe. Even if nuclear weapons remain in North Korea, their threat can be deterred by the threat of a massive nuclear retaliation by the United States in response to a North Korean nuclear attack on Japan. However, once the peace treaty is concluded, the public opinion in the R.O.K. may well demand the withdrawal of the U.S. forces from its soil. Further, if South and North Koreas should be reunified, it would mean the emergence, as Japan’s immediate neighbor, of a large power with its GDP slightly larger than that of Russia and with nuclear armament, harboring hostility towards Japan.

Amidst all this, would the United States, turning inward, leave Asia to China and withdraw its presence from Japan? Could Japan, standing naked and alone, be forced to cross swords with China, Unified Korea, Russia, and possibly the United States?

That is unlikely to happen. Asia is no less important a trading partner for the United States as the European Union. Without a foothold in Asia, namely the alliance with Japan, the United States would have to act at China’s bidding, instead of “working hand in hand with China”, and would have little to gain from Asia. For this reason, the United States needs the Japan-U.S. alliance as much as Japan does, and will continue to extend its nuclear umbrella over Japan.

However, the U.S. nuclear umbrella has become somewhat porose in recent years. Under the Obama administration, nuclear warheads were removed from the Tomahawk cruise missiles deployed in the Pacific Ocean. Today, the nuclear deterrence, which the United States can offer in the Western Pacific, is limited to ICBMs (long-range nuclear missiles) deployed in the U.S. mainland, long-range nuclear missiles carried by nuclear submarines, and nuclear bombs carried by the long-range bombers deployed in Guam.
None of these weapons would be easily usable. Even if, as Mr. Ishiba argued, the Non-Nuclear Three Principles were relaxed to allow port calls by nuclear-armed U.S. nuclear submarines, there would be no “ nuclear-armed U.S. warships calling on Japanese ports”, unless nuclear warheads are remounted on Tomahawk cruise missiles. Large nuclear submarines carrying long-range nuclear missiles operate in secrecy and would not call on Japanese ports.

What has been the situation in Germany, placed in a position similar to Japan after the end of WWII? Since Germany was spared atomic bombing, the visceral resistance to nuclear weapons is not as strong as in Japan. Since its West German days, it has allowed the deployment on its soil of a number of small nuclear bombs (tactical nuclear weapons), scores of which remain to this day. Those were designed to stem off the onslaught of advancing enemy troops, as massive as the Soviet troops of the past, by detonation right under their nose. These weapons can actually be used only by common decision of Germany and the United States. This is called the dual key system.
Belgium, the Netherlands and Italy have similar systems. However, the possession of nuclear weapons on one’s territory would make one more vulnerable as a target of preemptive attacks by the enemy.


The most suitable model for Japan might be the nuclear submarines with nuclear-tipped missiles as is the case in Britain and France. They are few in number in either country, but constitute sufficient nuclear deterrence. Should it become possible for the public opinion in Japan as well as in the world community to condone Japan’s nuclear armament, the quickest way would be to purchase such submarines from the United States, Britain or France, though it would by no means be easy to do that.

Today, as national borders are rapidly losing their relevance in economic transactions, wouldn’t there be only dwindling significance in sovereign states locking horns with one another on things like nuclear deterrence? That said, Japan’s neighboring countries are bent on their purported rivalry with Japan, putting their pride as sovereign states at stake and fueled by nationalistic zeal. Amidst all this, Japan has to engage in some hard, dispassionate thinking to explore how best to protect its honor and interests. This does not and should not mean that Japan again becomes an aggressive military power. As Japan needs more resources to cope with the challenges of a rapidly aging population, it simply cannot afford an untrammelled increase in defense spending.

(The writer is Former Japanese Ambassador to Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.
This article first appeared in the September 21 edition of Newsweek Japan.)

The English-Speaking Union of Japan




日本は核武装への道をたどるのか?
河東哲夫 / 元駐ウズベキスタン大使兼駐タジキスタン大使

2017年 9月 29日
  北朝鮮の核ミサイル開発が、「日本核武装」論議に火をつけた。日本の核武装はキッシンジャー元国務長官などがつとに予言していたことだが―日本はいつか米国に見捨てられ、慌てて核武装するという趣旨―、日本でも6日には石破元防衛相が、米国の核の傘をもっと有効なものにするには非核三原則の一部見直しが必要だと述べている。本音ベースの核論議が必要になっている。
 
 朝鮮半島情勢の先行きには、大きく分けて二つのシナリオがある。一つは中国も容認した上での米国による武力行使と核能力の破壊、もう一つは北朝鮮との話し合いによる事態収拾である。話し合いの場合、朝鮮戦争の正式な終結、つまり北朝鮮国家承認と外交関係の樹立、国境の確定などを定める平和条約の締結、そして北朝鮮の核の扱いが焦点となる。

ここまでなら、日本は安泰だ。たとえ北朝鮮に核が残っても、「日本を核攻撃すれば米国が大量報復する」という脅しで抑止できる。しかし平和条約が結ばれ、韓国世論が米軍撤退を求め、更に南北統一が起きると、ロシア以上のGDPと核兵器を持つ大国―そして反日的な―が日本のすぐ隣に出現することになる。

その中で、内向きになった米国は中国にアジアを委ね、日本からも手を引いてしまうだろうか? 日本は裸一貫で中国、統一朝鮮、ロシア、そしてもしかすると米国とも渡り合うことになるのだろうか?

そうはなるまい。アジアは米国にとって、EUと並ぶ貿易相手。アジアに足がかり―つまり日本―を持たねば、「中国と手を結ぶ」どころか、中国の言いなりにさせられて、アジアで稼ぎにくくなる。だから、日本との同盟関係は米国にとっても必要で、日本の上には核の傘がさしかけられ続けるだろう。

ただ米国の核の傘も、近年では少し透けてきている。オバマ大統領の時代、太平洋に展開するトマホーク巡航ミサイルから核弾頭を撤去したために、今では西太平洋で米国が保有する核抑止力は、米本土配備のICBM(長距離核ミサイル)、長距離核ミサイルを搭載した原潜、そしてグアム島配備の爆撃機に搭載した核爆弾と、機敏には使いにくいものばかりになっているからだ。石破氏が言うように、非核三原則を緩和して、核搭載の米軍艦の日本寄港を可能としても、トマホークに核弾頭を再び装着してもらわないと、「日本に寄港する核搭載の米艦船」は無いのである。長距離核ミサイル搭載の大型原潜は隠密で行動しているから、わざわざ日本に寄港したりしない。

戦後、日本と同じような立場にあるドイツはどうしているかと言うと、被爆国でないために核への反発は日本程でない。この国は西独の時代から、自国領土に米軍の小型核爆弾(戦術核)を何発も持ち込ませており、それは今でも数十発残っている。昔のソ連軍のような大軍が一気呵成に攻め込んできた時は、その鼻先でこの核爆弾を用いて敵の進軍を止めようというもので、使用する際はドイツ、米国双方の同意が必要であることからdual key(二重引き金)方式と呼ばれる。同種の仕組みはベルギー、オランダ、イタリアも持っている。しかし核兵器を自国領土に置けば、それは敵による先制攻撃の標的になりやすい。

日本に最も参考になるのは、英国とフランスの核ミサイル搭載原潜である。双方とも数は少ないが、核抑止力としては十分だ。世界、そして日本の世論が日本の核武装を許すような状況になれば、米国や英仏のいずれかから原潜を核ミサイル付きで購入するのが最も手っ取り早い(だが簡単ではない)。

経済取引では国境の意味がどんどん無くなる今の時代、核抑止とか言って、国家と国家が角突き合わせて争う意味は薄れる一方だ。しかし日本の周辺諸国家は、国家を前面に立てて日本と張り合う、ナショナリズムに燃えている。その中で、日本は自分の名誉と利益を守る方途を冷静に考えなければならない。それは軍事大国になることは全く意味していない。人口老齢化が進み資金がますます必要となっている今、国防費ばかり無暗に増やすわけにはいかないのである。

(筆者は元駐ウズベキスタン大使兼駐タジキスタン大使。本稿はニュースウイーク日本版2017年9月21日号に掲載された。)
一般社団法人 日本英語交流連盟