May 28, 2003

The most notable aspect of the Iraq War was that the U.S.-U.K. allied forces made maximum use of their strike capabilities through an integrated air and ground campaign, along with flexibility and leadership in operating their campaign. This came about as a consolidation and amalgamation of tactics based on the regional strategic vision pursued by the United States since the Gulf War. In particular, it included an attempt to limit damage to the U.S.-U.K. forces in ground battles by diminishing the organized military capabilities of the Iraqi Forces at an early stage through bombings by precision-guided weapons and aircraft and thus encouraging Iraqi troops and soldiers to surrender.

On the other hand, the Iraqi side - having ceded dominance over its airspace to the U.S.-U.K. forces - was unable to seize the upper hand and was limited to waging a defensive campaign, leaving the U.S. and U.K. side to take the initiative of the offensive throughout the war. This was due for the most part to the apparent lack of effective military or campaign guidance on the side of the Iraqis.

In terms of maintaining order in the global community and the future of international alliances, by far the most serious issue presented by the Iraq War is the role of the United Nations. It is clear that the U.N. Security Council ceased to function over the issues of inspections in Iraq and the use of military force. The United Nations has its origins in a collective security system under which the victors of World War II were to jointly maintain and secure peace and order in the global community in the post-war period. In particular, members of the Security Council have been endowed with rights and responsibilities that are incomparably greater than other member nations, which should be used for maintaining the peace and stability of the global community.

However, in reality, Security Council members have brought their own domestic politics and egos into the United Nations, exercising their vetoing rights and disabling the United Nations from functioning during the Cold War. And while it seemed to have finally recovered its intended role in the post-Cold War era, it is now apparent that that was only an illusion. Global order led by the United Nations is neither justice nor truth, but is the product of a world of collusion and egoism among Security Council member nations. The French have made a historical mistake in giving priority to its interests, and as long as such attitudes persist, it will be impossible to recover the United Nations to its original functions. The United Nations is faced with the greatest crisis since its founding, and it is time we held serious discussions on how to overcome the current situation. Furthermore, the issue will have a significant impact on international alliances, as seen in the major wedge that was driven into U.S.-European relations over the legal basis and response to military action taken by the United States and the United Kingdom.

We should also keep an eye on how the Iraq War will influence U.S. defense strategy and the commensurate responsibilities placed on its allies. Including the latest campaign, the United States has continuously involved itself in war over the past half century. U.S. Military Forces overwhelm other nations in all aspects ranging from tactics, weapons system, proficiency, morale, information, logistics, readiness, strike capability and flexibility. Having cut back on defense spending after the Cold War, allies including NATO and Japan are in no condition to provide cooperation in an alliance with U.S. forces in terms of overall military capability. The continuation of this state of affairs will undoubtedly cause problems in alliance participation and defense cooperation.

Meanwhile, the United States will be reviewing the substance of its alliance strategy and forward deployment strategy as a result of the Iraq War. It is only natural that both justification and incentive for deploying U.S. forces in high-risk regions and regions lacking positive cooperation from neighboring nations will be reduced. If U.S. military technology develops further to enable immediate overseas deployment of troops from the U.S. homeland in times of crisis, there is no reason to make the sacrifice of forward deployment in peacetime. We must pay attention to how such changes in U.S. strategy will affect its alliance with Japan and other nations, as well as the geographic distribution of its troop deployment. It is also time we reviewed the defensive role allocated to Japan by the Japan-U.S. alliance. We must lose no time in re-redefining the alliance to reconsider Japan's defense and defensive capabilities within that context.

Another noteworthy point is the possibility that the Iraq War may result in bringing structural change to the order of the Middle East and Gulf regions. Every major war brings change to the order pf a region in its aftermath. Changes brought about by this latest war present a turning-point that will decide whether democracy will take root in the Gulf region, and the crux will be the creation of a post-war system in Iraq and the extent of impact on the Middle East peace process. If all goes as envisaged by the United States, democracy will spread throughout the Gulf region alongside an expansion of U.S. influence, but if things go otherwise the region will become destabilized. We must carefully monitor how the strategic stability of the region may be affected by the retreat of U.S. forces from Saudi Arabia and subsequent deployment centered on Iraq, Qatar and Kuwait.

In any event, the United States will be unable to relax its hand in the Middle East-Gulf region for some time to come, and is expected to continue exerting diplomatic and military pressure on Iran, Syria and Saudi Arabia in particular. Such strategic moves by the United States will remain an important issue not only for the overall global order, but specifically for the security of the Gulf region and Japan.

The writer is Professor of International Development at Takushoku University.

2003年 5月 28日

イラク戦争の最大の特徴は米英連合軍の空地統合作戦による打撃力と作戦運用上の柔軟性・主導性が最大限に発揮されたことにある。これは米国が湾岸戦争以来進めてきた地域戦略構想に基づく戦術を総括し、集大成したものである。特に、精密誘導兵器・航空機による攻撃によってイラク軍の組織的戦闘力を早期に減殺し、イラク部隊・兵員の投降を促進して米英軍の地上戦闘による損害を局限しようと試みた。他方、イラク側は米英連合軍に航空優勢を確保されたまま有利に作戦を展開できず防戦作戦にとどまり、米英側の一方的な攻勢作戦に終始した。その最大理由はイラク側に有効な戦争指導・作戦指導が行われた形跡が見られなかったことである。

イラク戦争が国際社会の秩序や同盟のあり方に与えた影響の中で最も深刻な問題は国連のあり方についてである。今回、イラクへの査察や武力行使問題をめぐり国連安保理が機能しなくなったことは明確である。国連は本来、第二次大戦後における国際社会の平和と秩序を戦勝国代表の共同管理によって維持確保しようとした集団安全保障システムである。特に、安保理常任理事国は他の加盟国とは比べ物にならないほど大きな権限と責任が与えられているが、それは国際社会の平和と安定を維持するためにこそ使用されなければならない。しかし、実際には常任理事国が自国の国益や国内政治やエゴを国連に持ち込んで拒否権を行使し、ために国連は冷戦期から殆ど機能しなかったし、冷戦後に国連はようやく本来の機能を回復したかに思えたがそれは幻想であったことがはっきりした。国連による国際秩序は正義でも真理でもなく、安保理常任理事国の馴れ合いとエゴの世界である。フランスのとった態度は歴史的な過ちであり、このような態度を取る限り、国連が本来の機能を取り戻すことは不可能である。国連は創設以来最大の危機に直面しており、これを乗り越えるためにはどのようにすれば良いのかについて真剣に考える時期が来ている。しかも、この問題は同盟関係にも大きな影響を与え、米・英による武力行使の法的根拠と対応を巡って米欧関係に大きな亀裂が入った。

イラク戦争が米国の国防戦略と同盟国間の役割分担に与える影響も注視する必要がある。今回の作戦に限らず米国はこの半世紀、絶えず戦闘に従事してきた。米軍は戦術・兵器・練度・士気・情報・後方・即応性・打撃力・柔軟性などあらゆる分野において他国を圧倒しており、同盟国はＮＡＴＯ・日本を含め冷戦後に防衛費を削減し、総合戦闘力の面でとても米軍と同盟協力が実施できるような状況ではなくなっている。こうした実態が継続すると同盟協力・防衛協力にも問題が生じてくることは明らかである。他方、米国はイラク戦争の結果として同盟関係のあり方や前方展開戦略の中味を再検討することになるであろう。リスクの高い地域や接受国から積極的な受け入れがない地域に米軍を展開しておく理由とインセンテイブが低下することも自然の成り行きである。米国の軍事技術が進展し緊急時に短時間で大量の兵力を本土から機動展開できるなら平時に犠牲を払って前方展開しておく必要はない。このような米国の戦略変化が日米同盟など同盟国関係や米軍の兵力展開構成にいかなる影響をもたらすかについては注意していく必要がある。また、このような日米同盟の役割分担のなかで日本の防衛が果たすべき役割について考え直す時期がきている。速やかに日米同盟の再々定義を行い、その下での防衛と防衛力のあり方を検討する必要がある。また、イラク戦争が中東・湾岸地域の秩序に構造的変化をもたらす可能性があるという点も注目される。大きな戦争が終わると秩序が変化する。今回の変化は湾岸地域に民主主義体制が根付くかどうかという分かれ目になり、その節目はイラクの戦後体制の構築と中東和平への影響である。米国の思惑とおりになれば湾岸に民主主義が拡散し米国の影響力が拡大するがうまくいかないと湾岸地域は不安定化する。米軍がサウジから撤退し、イラク、カタール、クエートを中心に展開することが湾岸地域の戦略的安定にいかなる影響を与えるか注視する必要がある。いずれにしても米国は、当分の間、中東・湾岸地域から手を抜く事が出来ず、特に、イラン・シリア・サウジなどへの外交的・軍事的圧力をかけ続けるであろう。こうした米国の政策動向は当面、国際秩序全体のみならず、湾岸地域や日本の安全保障にとって重要課題であり続ける。

（筆者は拓殖大学国際開発学部教授）