GSDF Returns from Iraq with Homework for the Japanese People
KITAMURA Fumio / Journalist
September 7, 2006
Japan's Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) completed the withdrawal of its entire troop from Iraq by the end of July. While this was not its first experience on foreign territory, the GSDF's past missions were limited to either participating in United Nations Peace Keeping Operations (PKO) or in disaster relief, and its dispatch to war-torn Iraq was an exceptional case that deviated from these two criteria.
In that sense, the GSDF's presence in Iraq, which continued for two and a half years, was a historic event that marked an important turning point in Japanese diplomacy. The Japanese people must now face up to the task of earnestly evaluating the issues left behind by the GSDF mission to determine Japan's stance on international contribution. We must begin this process of evaluation by once again questioning the legitimacy of its dispatch to Iraq under a Constitution that prohibits the use of military force in conflict resolution. According to the prevailing interpretation of the Constitution, the SDF can defend itself, but cannot act in collective defense. Thus its dispatch to Iraq, a country gripped by a bloody conflict, had been a major point of contention from a political as well as a legal perspective.
To create a legal basis for dispatching the SDF to Iraq, the administration of Prime Minister Koizumi Jun'ichiro passed a temporary statute - the Special Law for Assisting Iraqi Reconstruction. Under this piece of legislation, the SDF's mission was limited to "humanitarian support for reconstruction," and to activities within "noncombat" zones. The main mission of the U.S. armed forces, as well as the U.K. and other armies dispatched to Iraq, had been to maintain order under circumstances where fighting was anticipated. Within this military force army that constituted the "Coalition of the Willing," the SDF had an exceptional status, and the role of defending it was entrusted to the British and Dutch occupational forces.
Now that the GSDF has returned home safely, there is a widespread sense of relief in Japan that its members "fired not a single bullet and suffered not a single casualty." Major newspapers ran editorials that prominently gave voice to this public mood. It is doubtful that such sentiments - though accepted in Japan -is being shared abroad.
In an interview with a correspondent from Japan's public broadcaster NHK, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki repeatedly expressed his gratitude towards the SDF for "its contribution to maintaining order," perhaps reflecting the fact that Iraqi government officials viewed the SDF in the same light as the British and other troops of the multinational force. U.S. President George Bush also rained continuous praise on Prime Minister Koizumi for dispatching the SDF, but his comments were made within the context of Japan's endorsement and support for the war in Iraq and contained next to nothing about the exceptional nature of SDF's mission. On his part, Prime Minister Koizumi explained the reason for dispatching the SDF by repeating his logic of placing equal emphasis on "humanitarian support for reconstruction" and "the importance of the Japan-U.S. alliance."
Against this backdrop, the international community will inevitably conclude that Japan's primary motive lay in emphasizing the Japan-U.S. alliance. Dispatching the SDF also had the undeniable side effect of highlighting the difference between Japan's position and that of France, Germany and other countries that opposed the Iraq War.
We must also contemplate the reality of "humanitarian support for reconstruction" from a broader perspective – that of achieving stability and reconstruction in Iraq as a whole. Samawa, in Musanna Prefecture, was chosen as the location of the SDF mission, following thorough prior research that determined it to be "the region where order was best maintained." About two years'ago, I had the opportunity to meet leaders from Samawa -- religious leaders, teachers and doctors-- who had been invited to Tokyo. "Why is there no bloodshed in Samawa?" I asked, and the religious leader who also led the group answered: "Because the residents share a deep reverence for their elders that sustains a strong sense of community." Their range of vision did not extend beyond the Samawa region.
The discussion enlightened me to the tragic reality of Iraq, where stately functions had been dismantled and the entire nation was divided along the lines of religious sects and regional communities. With a population of 26 million, Iraq is a major country in the Middle East. Samawa is a small town of 50,000, and even including the surrounding regions, the number of inhabitants would at most total 200,000. The residents must have undoubtedly felt grateful for Japan's "humanitarian support for reconstruction," and welcomed the SDF's presence. However, according to local reports by the Japanese media, SDF activities are little known among Iraqis outside Samawa, who may have viewed the SDF as assisting the U.S. war effort in Iraq. There were several incidents in which Japanese were taken hostage by militant Iraqi resistance, and their impossible demand for the "immediate withdrawal of the SDF" may have reflected their perception of Japan's role.
From the 1960's through the 1980's, I visited Iraq on numerous occasions as a correspondent for a major national newspaper. And each time, I was strongly impressed by the amicable feeling expressed by the Iraqi people for Japan. How will the Iraq War change this invaluable asset of friendship accumulated over the years? As one who knew Iraq well in the past, I remain greatly concerned.
The writer is a former Professor of Shukutoku University and former Senior Editor and London Bureau Chief of the Yomiuri Shimbun.
In that sense, the GSDF's presence in Iraq, which continued for two and a half years, was a historic event that marked an important turning point in Japanese diplomacy. The Japanese people must now face up to the task of earnestly evaluating the issues left behind by the GSDF mission to determine Japan's stance on international contribution. We must begin this process of evaluation by once again questioning the legitimacy of its dispatch to Iraq under a Constitution that prohibits the use of military force in conflict resolution. According to the prevailing interpretation of the Constitution, the SDF can defend itself, but cannot act in collective defense. Thus its dispatch to Iraq, a country gripped by a bloody conflict, had been a major point of contention from a political as well as a legal perspective.
To create a legal basis for dispatching the SDF to Iraq, the administration of Prime Minister Koizumi Jun'ichiro passed a temporary statute - the Special Law for Assisting Iraqi Reconstruction. Under this piece of legislation, the SDF's mission was limited to "humanitarian support for reconstruction," and to activities within "noncombat" zones. The main mission of the U.S. armed forces, as well as the U.K. and other armies dispatched to Iraq, had been to maintain order under circumstances where fighting was anticipated. Within this military force army that constituted the "Coalition of the Willing," the SDF had an exceptional status, and the role of defending it was entrusted to the British and Dutch occupational forces.
Now that the GSDF has returned home safely, there is a widespread sense of relief in Japan that its members "fired not a single bullet and suffered not a single casualty." Major newspapers ran editorials that prominently gave voice to this public mood. It is doubtful that such sentiments - though accepted in Japan -is being shared abroad.
In an interview with a correspondent from Japan's public broadcaster NHK, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki repeatedly expressed his gratitude towards the SDF for "its contribution to maintaining order," perhaps reflecting the fact that Iraqi government officials viewed the SDF in the same light as the British and other troops of the multinational force. U.S. President George Bush also rained continuous praise on Prime Minister Koizumi for dispatching the SDF, but his comments were made within the context of Japan's endorsement and support for the war in Iraq and contained next to nothing about the exceptional nature of SDF's mission. On his part, Prime Minister Koizumi explained the reason for dispatching the SDF by repeating his logic of placing equal emphasis on "humanitarian support for reconstruction" and "the importance of the Japan-U.S. alliance."
Against this backdrop, the international community will inevitably conclude that Japan's primary motive lay in emphasizing the Japan-U.S. alliance. Dispatching the SDF also had the undeniable side effect of highlighting the difference between Japan's position and that of France, Germany and other countries that opposed the Iraq War.
We must also contemplate the reality of "humanitarian support for reconstruction" from a broader perspective – that of achieving stability and reconstruction in Iraq as a whole. Samawa, in Musanna Prefecture, was chosen as the location of the SDF mission, following thorough prior research that determined it to be "the region where order was best maintained." About two years'ago, I had the opportunity to meet leaders from Samawa -- religious leaders, teachers and doctors-- who had been invited to Tokyo. "Why is there no bloodshed in Samawa?" I asked, and the religious leader who also led the group answered: "Because the residents share a deep reverence for their elders that sustains a strong sense of community." Their range of vision did not extend beyond the Samawa region.
The discussion enlightened me to the tragic reality of Iraq, where stately functions had been dismantled and the entire nation was divided along the lines of religious sects and regional communities. With a population of 26 million, Iraq is a major country in the Middle East. Samawa is a small town of 50,000, and even including the surrounding regions, the number of inhabitants would at most total 200,000. The residents must have undoubtedly felt grateful for Japan's "humanitarian support for reconstruction," and welcomed the SDF's presence. However, according to local reports by the Japanese media, SDF activities are little known among Iraqis outside Samawa, who may have viewed the SDF as assisting the U.S. war effort in Iraq. There were several incidents in which Japanese were taken hostage by militant Iraqi resistance, and their impossible demand for the "immediate withdrawal of the SDF" may have reflected their perception of Japan's role.
From the 1960's through the 1980's, I visited Iraq on numerous occasions as a correspondent for a major national newspaper. And each time, I was strongly impressed by the amicable feeling expressed by the Iraqi people for Japan. How will the Iraq War change this invaluable asset of friendship accumulated over the years? As one who knew Iraq well in the past, I remain greatly concerned.
The writer is a former Professor of Shukutoku University and former Senior Editor and London Bureau Chief of the Yomiuri Shimbun.
The English-Speaking Union of Japan
陸上自衛隊イラク派遣が残した問題
北村 文夫 / ジャーナリスト
2006年 9月 7日
イラク派遣の陸上自衛隊が、７月末までに全員撤収を完了した。外国領土での活動は陸上自衛隊にとって未経験ではない。しかし従来の活動はいずれもが、国連平和維持活動（PKO）か災害救援かの任務を帯びていた。戦乱の地イラクへの派遣はこの二つの基準からはずれる異質のケースだった。
その意味で、２年半に及んだ陸上自衛隊のイラク駐留は、日本外交の重大な転機を画した歴史的な出来事であった。日本国民はいま、日本による国際貢献の在り方を考えるために、自衛隊イラク派遣が残した問題への真剣に検討を迫られている。この検証作業はまず、紛争解決のための武力行使を禁じた日本国憲法のもとで自衛隊イラク派遣が合法的だったかどうか、という問題への問い直しから始めねばならない。現在の憲法解釈によれば、自衛隊は自衛権はもつものの、集団自衛権の発動は認められない。流血抗争が続くイラクへの自衛隊派遣は、政治面だけでなく法制面でも重大な争点となった。
小泉政権はイラク派遣の法的根拠を作るために、時限立法の「イラク復興支援特別措置法」を制定した。同法により自衛隊任務は「人道的復興支援」に限定され、戦闘行為には不関与が定められた。米国軍は言うまでもなく、イラクに派遣された英国などの軍隊は、戦闘を想定した治安維持を主要任務にしていた。この「有志連合」軍隊のなかで、自衛隊は特殊な存在であり、それを防御する役割は英国、オランダなどの駐留軍にまかされた。
陸上自衛隊が無事帰国したいま、日本国内では自衛隊員が「一発の銃弾も発射せず、一人の犠牲者も出さなかった」ことへの安堵感が広がっている。全国紙社説でもこうした気分を代弁する論調が目立った。日本国内で消費されるこのたぐいの言説が、果たして外国でも共有されているだろうか。
イラク政府のマリキ首相はNHK特派員とのインタビューで、自衛隊による「治安維持への貢献」への謝意を繰り返した。自衛隊に対しイラク政府首脳が、英国軍などと同様の多国籍軍とみなしているからだろう。ブッシュ大統領も自衛隊を派遣してくれた小泉首相を称賛し続けたが、一連の発言はイラク戦争を日本が支持し、支援してくれたという文脈でなされたもので、自衛隊任務の特殊性についてはほとんど触れていなかった。一方で小泉首相も、自衛隊派遣の理由として、「人道復興支援」と「日米同盟の重要さ」を並列的に結び付ける論理を繰り返した。
こうした背景から、自衛隊派遣の主要動機は「日米同盟」重視だった、との見方が国際社会で定着するのは避けられまい。また自衛隊派遣が、イラク戦争に反対した仏独両国などと日本の立場の相違が鮮明化する副次効果を生んだことも否定できない。
「人道復興支援」の実態についても、イラク全体の安定と復興という観点からの大局的な検証が必要である。自衛隊の駐留地に選ばれたのは、念入りな事前調査で「もっとも治安良好な地域」と判定されたムサンナ県サマワだった。私は東京に招かれたサマワ有力指導者（宗教指導者、教師、医師ら）と懇談する機会をもったことがある。２年ほど前のことである。「なぜサワマでは流血抗争が起きないのか」という私の問いに、リーダー格の宗教指導者は「住民が長老を深く敬愛し、強い共同体意識が保たれているからだ」と答えた。しかしサマワ指導者たちの視界には、サマワ地域のことだけしか入っていなかった。
この懇談は、国家機能が崩壊し、全土が宗派や地域共同体などを軸に分断されるイラクの悲劇的な現状を教えてくれた。イラクは人口2600万人、中東きっての大国である。サマワは人口５万人足らずの小さな町で、周辺地域を含めても住民数はせいぜい20万人。現地住民は「人道復興支援」を感謝し、自衛隊を歓迎したことだろう。しかし、日本マスコミの現地報道によれば、サマワ以外の地域のイラク人には自衛隊活動はほとんど知られていないという。これらイラク人は、自衛隊を米国のイラク戦争への補助要員と見なしているかも知れない。イラクの武装抵抗勢力による日本人拉致事件も数回起きたが、そのたびに「自衛隊の即時撤退」という無理難題を突き付けてきたのも、こうした対日感情を裏書きしているのだろう。
私は全国紙の中東特派員として、1960年代から80年代にかけて、イラクを何回も現地取材した。その都度、いつも強く印象づけられたのは、イラク人が日本に寄せる親愛の情の深さだった。イラク戦争によって、日本が蓄積してきた対日友情という貴重な資産がどのように変わるだろうか。かつてのイラクをよく知る私には、このことがひどく気にかかる。
（筆者は元淑徳大学教授、元読売新聞編集委員、ロンドン総局長）
その意味で、２年半に及んだ陸上自衛隊のイラク駐留は、日本外交の重大な転機を画した歴史的な出来事であった。日本国民はいま、日本による国際貢献の在り方を考えるために、自衛隊イラク派遣が残した問題への真剣に検討を迫られている。この検証作業はまず、紛争解決のための武力行使を禁じた日本国憲法のもとで自衛隊イラク派遣が合法的だったかどうか、という問題への問い直しから始めねばならない。現在の憲法解釈によれば、自衛隊は自衛権はもつものの、集団自衛権の発動は認められない。流血抗争が続くイラクへの自衛隊派遣は、政治面だけでなく法制面でも重大な争点となった。
小泉政権はイラク派遣の法的根拠を作るために、時限立法の「イラク復興支援特別措置法」を制定した。同法により自衛隊任務は「人道的復興支援」に限定され、戦闘行為には不関与が定められた。米国軍は言うまでもなく、イラクに派遣された英国などの軍隊は、戦闘を想定した治安維持を主要任務にしていた。この「有志連合」軍隊のなかで、自衛隊は特殊な存在であり、それを防御する役割は英国、オランダなどの駐留軍にまかされた。
陸上自衛隊が無事帰国したいま、日本国内では自衛隊員が「一発の銃弾も発射せず、一人の犠牲者も出さなかった」ことへの安堵感が広がっている。全国紙社説でもこうした気分を代弁する論調が目立った。日本国内で消費されるこのたぐいの言説が、果たして外国でも共有されているだろうか。
イラク政府のマリキ首相はNHK特派員とのインタビューで、自衛隊による「治安維持への貢献」への謝意を繰り返した。自衛隊に対しイラク政府首脳が、英国軍などと同様の多国籍軍とみなしているからだろう。ブッシュ大統領も自衛隊を派遣してくれた小泉首相を称賛し続けたが、一連の発言はイラク戦争を日本が支持し、支援してくれたという文脈でなされたもので、自衛隊任務の特殊性についてはほとんど触れていなかった。一方で小泉首相も、自衛隊派遣の理由として、「人道復興支援」と「日米同盟の重要さ」を並列的に結び付ける論理を繰り返した。
こうした背景から、自衛隊派遣の主要動機は「日米同盟」重視だった、との見方が国際社会で定着するのは避けられまい。また自衛隊派遣が、イラク戦争に反対した仏独両国などと日本の立場の相違が鮮明化する副次効果を生んだことも否定できない。
「人道復興支援」の実態についても、イラク全体の安定と復興という観点からの大局的な検証が必要である。自衛隊の駐留地に選ばれたのは、念入りな事前調査で「もっとも治安良好な地域」と判定されたムサンナ県サマワだった。私は東京に招かれたサマワ有力指導者（宗教指導者、教師、医師ら）と懇談する機会をもったことがある。２年ほど前のことである。「なぜサワマでは流血抗争が起きないのか」という私の問いに、リーダー格の宗教指導者は「住民が長老を深く敬愛し、強い共同体意識が保たれているからだ」と答えた。しかしサマワ指導者たちの視界には、サマワ地域のことだけしか入っていなかった。
この懇談は、国家機能が崩壊し、全土が宗派や地域共同体などを軸に分断されるイラクの悲劇的な現状を教えてくれた。イラクは人口2600万人、中東きっての大国である。サマワは人口５万人足らずの小さな町で、周辺地域を含めても住民数はせいぜい20万人。現地住民は「人道復興支援」を感謝し、自衛隊を歓迎したことだろう。しかし、日本マスコミの現地報道によれば、サマワ以外の地域のイラク人には自衛隊活動はほとんど知られていないという。これらイラク人は、自衛隊を米国のイラク戦争への補助要員と見なしているかも知れない。イラクの武装抵抗勢力による日本人拉致事件も数回起きたが、そのたびに「自衛隊の即時撤退」という無理難題を突き付けてきたのも、こうした対日感情を裏書きしているのだろう。
私は全国紙の中東特派員として、1960年代から80年代にかけて、イラクを何回も現地取材した。その都度、いつも強く印象づけられたのは、イラク人が日本に寄せる親愛の情の深さだった。イラク戦争によって、日本が蓄積してきた対日友情という貴重な資産がどのように変わるだろうか。かつてのイラクをよく知る私には、このことがひどく気にかかる。
（筆者は元淑徳大学教授、元読売新聞編集委員、ロンドン総局長）
一般社団法人 日本英語交流連盟