Political Gridlock in Japan
NISHIKAWA Megumi / Journalist
March 28, 2008
In observing the politics and the policy-making process of Japan since last summer, I get the impression that Japan has lost its composure or confidence in itself as a nation. Its range of choice and actions has so narrowed that it has lost all flexibility. Three issues recently coming to the fore one after another have reinforced this impression: the extension of the special anti-terrorism law to enable the Maritime Self-Defense Force's refueling operation in the Indian Ocean, the tax reform bill containing a clause that preserves the provisionally added gasoline tax surcharges, and the recent fiasco over the appointment of the governor of the Bank of Japan (BOJ).
First, the special anti-terrorism law expired on November 1 last year because the main opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) opposed it. Using their overwhelming majority in the Lower House, the ruling coalition rammed it through the Lower House a second time by a two-thirds majority in January after it was rejected by the Upper House, and the re-fueling operation was resumed in February. They had to resort to the emergency tactic of "passing a bill a second time in the Lower House," which had not been used in 57 years. Second, a new central bank chief to succeed outgoing BOJ governor Toshihiko Fukui could not be appointed before his term expired on March 19, and now that top BOJ post is vacant, a most unusual situation. Third, at the time of this writing, it appears difficult for the tax reform bill to be passed before the end of the fiscal year, with only a few days left.
These three issues have followed, or about to follow, the same pattern. The issues were brought to the fore just days before the deadline. Rather than making an effort to reach a policy agreement, priority has been placed on gaining a political advantage. The discussion has been inward-looking from start to finish, without any consideration for what kind of message these problems will send out to the world. This is particularly true for the special anti-terrorism bill and the BOJ governor's appointment, which serve as litmus tests for measuring Japan's relationship with the international community. The foreign media have been critical of the inward-looking way Japan is addressing these political problems.
From the perspective of Japanese politics, this situation is a "political gridlock produced by the opposition bloc gaining the majority in the Upper House election in July 2007." The opposition DPJ is sticking to its non-compromising stand in order to drive the Fukuda government into a corner, which, I suppose, is an acceptable tactic in parliamentary democracy. The debate in the Diet over the extension of the provisionary tax rate exposed the wasteful spending of taxpayers'money, the practice of handing retiring bureaucrats sinecures outside government, and other slipshod practices of the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, so we cannot summarily say that the opposition's confrontational stance has been entirely unproductive. However, over and above the bargaining between the political parties, it seems to me that below the surface the fiasco over these three issues is not unrelated to the narrowing of the range of choice and actions for Japan.
From the end of the 1990's, we have felt the range of choice and actions that Japan can take narrowing in various areas. The zero interest rate and ultra-low interest rate policies over the years and the accumulated budget deficit have made Japan's monetary policy rigid and inflexible. The declining birthrate and the graying population are also robbing the society of flexibility. In a nutshell, Japan's power as a nation has weakened, and, accordingly, it is also losing its composure and confidence in itself. It is in this context that I think we should consider the series of problems including the appointment of the BOJ governor. A democratic nation with good government organs and systems incorporates a system of flexibly absorbing given restrictive conditions by its organs and systems. I cannot help feeling that that flexible structure seems to be gradually disappearing from the Japanese system.
The writer is a Senior Staff Writer at the Mainichi Newspapers.
First, the special anti-terrorism law expired on November 1 last year because the main opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) opposed it. Using their overwhelming majority in the Lower House, the ruling coalition rammed it through the Lower House a second time by a two-thirds majority in January after it was rejected by the Upper House, and the re-fueling operation was resumed in February. They had to resort to the emergency tactic of "passing a bill a second time in the Lower House," which had not been used in 57 years. Second, a new central bank chief to succeed outgoing BOJ governor Toshihiko Fukui could not be appointed before his term expired on March 19, and now that top BOJ post is vacant, a most unusual situation. Third, at the time of this writing, it appears difficult for the tax reform bill to be passed before the end of the fiscal year, with only a few days left.
These three issues have followed, or about to follow, the same pattern. The issues were brought to the fore just days before the deadline. Rather than making an effort to reach a policy agreement, priority has been placed on gaining a political advantage. The discussion has been inward-looking from start to finish, without any consideration for what kind of message these problems will send out to the world. This is particularly true for the special anti-terrorism bill and the BOJ governor's appointment, which serve as litmus tests for measuring Japan's relationship with the international community. The foreign media have been critical of the inward-looking way Japan is addressing these political problems.
From the perspective of Japanese politics, this situation is a "political gridlock produced by the opposition bloc gaining the majority in the Upper House election in July 2007." The opposition DPJ is sticking to its non-compromising stand in order to drive the Fukuda government into a corner, which, I suppose, is an acceptable tactic in parliamentary democracy. The debate in the Diet over the extension of the provisionary tax rate exposed the wasteful spending of taxpayers'money, the practice of handing retiring bureaucrats sinecures outside government, and other slipshod practices of the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, so we cannot summarily say that the opposition's confrontational stance has been entirely unproductive. However, over and above the bargaining between the political parties, it seems to me that below the surface the fiasco over these three issues is not unrelated to the narrowing of the range of choice and actions for Japan.
From the end of the 1990's, we have felt the range of choice and actions that Japan can take narrowing in various areas. The zero interest rate and ultra-low interest rate policies over the years and the accumulated budget deficit have made Japan's monetary policy rigid and inflexible. The declining birthrate and the graying population are also robbing the society of flexibility. In a nutshell, Japan's power as a nation has weakened, and, accordingly, it is also losing its composure and confidence in itself. It is in this context that I think we should consider the series of problems including the appointment of the BOJ governor. A democratic nation with good government organs and systems incorporates a system of flexibly absorbing given restrictive conditions by its organs and systems. I cannot help feeling that that flexible structure seems to be gradually disappearing from the Japanese system.
The writer is a Senior Staff Writer at the Mainichi Newspapers.
The English-Speaking Union of Japan
選択と行動の幅が狭まる日本
西川 恵 / ジャーナリスト
2008年 3月 28日
昨年夏以来、日本の政治の政策決定過程をみていて思うのは、国として余裕がなくなっているということだ。国の選択と行動の余地が狭まって、柔軟性が失われている。インド洋での給油活動に関するテロ特別措置法の延長問題、揮発油税の暫定税率延長を含む租税特別措置法改正案問題、日銀総裁人事問題と、相次いで生起した３つの問題を見ての感想である。
テロ特措法延長問題は民主党の反対で、昨年11月１日に期限切れ失効となった。今年１月、与党は多数を占める衆院で延長について再可決し、ようやく２月から給油活動を再開した。「衆院での再可決」という57年ぶりの非常手段がとられた末である。日銀総裁人事は福井俊彦総裁の任期が切れる３月19日までに決まらず、日銀総裁の席が空白という異例事態になった。もう一つの租税特措法改正案は（これを書いている現時点で）、年度内成立が日程的に難しくなっている。
この３つは、いずれも同じパターンをとっている（もしくはたどろうとしている）。期限切れを前にしてあたふたと問題が提起されること。政策合意への努力より、政局・政略が優先されていること。そしてこれが世界にどのようなメッセージを投げることになるかは脇にやられ、内向きの議論に終始していることだ。特にテロ特措法と日銀総裁人事は、国際社会に対する日本のかかわり方を計るリトマス試験紙になっているが、内向きの日本の政治に外国メディアは批判的だ。
永田町の視点から解説するなら「７月の参院選での与野党逆転がもたらした政治の手詰まり」ということになる。民主党は福田政権を追い詰めるために非妥協的姿勢を貫いており、議会民主主義においてはこうした手法もあり得るだろう。また暫定税率延長にからむ議会審議では、税金の使途、天下りなどをめぐり国土交通省のずさんな実体が明るみに出ており、対決姿勢を一概に不毛と言い切ることはできない。ただそうした政党間の駆け引きを越えて、この３つの問題をめぐるドタバタは、日本の国の選択肢・行動の幅が狭まっていることと底流ではつながっているように思われる。
90年代末ごろから日本がとり得る選択肢・行動の幅が狭まっていることは、さまざまな分野で実感されている。長年のゼロ・超低金利と累積する財政赤字は、金融政策を硬直的なものにしている。少子高齢化の進行も社会から柔軟性を奪いつつある。ひとことで言えば国力の衰えで、それに応じて国としてゆとりがなくなりつつある。日銀総裁人事などの一連の問題も、この脈絡で捕らえる必要があると私は思う。本来、よき統治機構と制度をもっている民主主義国家は、所与の制約条件を機構・制度によって柔軟に吸収する仕組みを内に組み込んでいる。その柔軟構造が徐々に日本のシステムから奪われているのではないだろうか。
（筆者は毎日新聞 専門編集委員。）
テロ特措法延長問題は民主党の反対で、昨年11月１日に期限切れ失効となった。今年１月、与党は多数を占める衆院で延長について再可決し、ようやく２月から給油活動を再開した。「衆院での再可決」という57年ぶりの非常手段がとられた末である。日銀総裁人事は福井俊彦総裁の任期が切れる３月19日までに決まらず、日銀総裁の席が空白という異例事態になった。もう一つの租税特措法改正案は（これを書いている現時点で）、年度内成立が日程的に難しくなっている。
この３つは、いずれも同じパターンをとっている（もしくはたどろうとしている）。期限切れを前にしてあたふたと問題が提起されること。政策合意への努力より、政局・政略が優先されていること。そしてこれが世界にどのようなメッセージを投げることになるかは脇にやられ、内向きの議論に終始していることだ。特にテロ特措法と日銀総裁人事は、国際社会に対する日本のかかわり方を計るリトマス試験紙になっているが、内向きの日本の政治に外国メディアは批判的だ。
永田町の視点から解説するなら「７月の参院選での与野党逆転がもたらした政治の手詰まり」ということになる。民主党は福田政権を追い詰めるために非妥協的姿勢を貫いており、議会民主主義においてはこうした手法もあり得るだろう。また暫定税率延長にからむ議会審議では、税金の使途、天下りなどをめぐり国土交通省のずさんな実体が明るみに出ており、対決姿勢を一概に不毛と言い切ることはできない。ただそうした政党間の駆け引きを越えて、この３つの問題をめぐるドタバタは、日本の国の選択肢・行動の幅が狭まっていることと底流ではつながっているように思われる。
90年代末ごろから日本がとり得る選択肢・行動の幅が狭まっていることは、さまざまな分野で実感されている。長年のゼロ・超低金利と累積する財政赤字は、金融政策を硬直的なものにしている。少子高齢化の進行も社会から柔軟性を奪いつつある。ひとことで言えば国力の衰えで、それに応じて国としてゆとりがなくなりつつある。日銀総裁人事などの一連の問題も、この脈絡で捕らえる必要があると私は思う。本来、よき統治機構と制度をもっている民主主義国家は、所与の制約条件を機構・制度によって柔軟に吸収する仕組みを内に組み込んでいる。その柔軟構造が徐々に日本のシステムから奪われているのではないだろうか。
（筆者は毎日新聞 専門編集委員。）
一般社団法人 日本英語交流連盟