The Bush Administration's Korean Peninsula Policy
MORIMOTO Satoshi / Professor of international development at Takusyoku University
May 9, 2001
US President George Bush has yet to present his administration's policies in their entirety. However, judging from tendencies that have become apparent in the past three months, it seems that the administration intends first to structure its international relationships based on the core policies of diplomacy and security, and then to pursue individual policies within that framework. Furthermore, the administration's policies are characterized by a realistic approach and contain many aspects of power politics.
And while the administration's Asia policy hasn't been revealed in its totality either, at least in its relationship with China - initiated by the surveillance plane collision incident - it is noteworthy that a communication route for crisis management was established through a frank acknowledgement of each others' standpoints. Nevertheless, the administration hasn't reached a final conclusion on its assessment of China's current status and its future.
The US is also undecided on its policies on the Korean Peninsula. However, judging from its tendencies, the Bush Administration is expected to take a hard line against the innate predisposition of the North Korean leadership and the threat it poses for other countries that has remained unchanged within North Korea. On the other hand, any fundamental revision of the Agreed Framework between the US and North Korea - which includes the KEDO (Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization) - would be unrealistic because that would mean having to start all over to renegotiate the terms.
It seems then that the US is left with few options for action. To be sure, US defense experts such as the Commander in Chief of the US Pacific Command and the Commander of the US Forces in Korea, have expressed their concern about the modernization of North Korean military forces, and the US has in no way eased its vigil against North Korea. On this point, the Bush Administration, rather than showing its support towards South Korea's engagement policy in its present form, has taken the stand that practical issues such as the connecting of railways and highways that are being promoted between the two Koreas work to undermine the containment strategy against North Korea hitherto constructed through US-South Korea cooperation, giving the South Korean government a headache.
Needless to say the Bush Administration will pursue a dynamic foreign policy under Secretary of State Colin Powell, who is said to prefer conducting diplomacy through his Assistant Secretary and Acting Assistant Secretary rather than appointing special envoys, and who has already dismissed Charles Kartman, Special Envoy for the Korean Peace Talks.
Meanwhile, North Korea has been mostly inactive in the area of foreign relations since March, and diplomatic negotiations for General Secretary Kim Jong-Il's scheduled visits to South Korea and Russia have remained at a standstill. The North Korean government no doubt would prefer to wait for the Bush Administration's next move. Relations between the two Koreas, as well as that between Japan and North Korea, have likewise stagnated, and diplomatic matters are likely to show no progress until after the start of US-North Korean relations.
In any case, we must wait until the Bush Administration lays bare its policy towards the Korean Peninsula, and then ascertain North Korea's reactions. In the event, we must pay special attention to South Korea's domestic policies, such as how the government will respond to internal criticism and opposition against its North Korean policies, while another important focal point would be how Japan, the US and South Korea should cooperate under the present circumstances where the three countries' policy priorities are not identical.
The Bush Administration has a four-year term ahead of it, while the administration of South Korean President Kim Dae-Jung has elections coming up at the end of next year and doesn't have as much time. Under such circumstances, Japan would need to redouble its past efforts to promote strategic dialogue and policy coordination with the US and South Korea in pursuing its national interests.
The writer is a professor of international development at Takusyoku University. He is a former director of National Security Division of Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
And while the administration's Asia policy hasn't been revealed in its totality either, at least in its relationship with China - initiated by the surveillance plane collision incident - it is noteworthy that a communication route for crisis management was established through a frank acknowledgement of each others' standpoints. Nevertheless, the administration hasn't reached a final conclusion on its assessment of China's current status and its future.
The US is also undecided on its policies on the Korean Peninsula. However, judging from its tendencies, the Bush Administration is expected to take a hard line against the innate predisposition of the North Korean leadership and the threat it poses for other countries that has remained unchanged within North Korea. On the other hand, any fundamental revision of the Agreed Framework between the US and North Korea - which includes the KEDO (Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization) - would be unrealistic because that would mean having to start all over to renegotiate the terms.
It seems then that the US is left with few options for action. To be sure, US defense experts such as the Commander in Chief of the US Pacific Command and the Commander of the US Forces in Korea, have expressed their concern about the modernization of North Korean military forces, and the US has in no way eased its vigil against North Korea. On this point, the Bush Administration, rather than showing its support towards South Korea's engagement policy in its present form, has taken the stand that practical issues such as the connecting of railways and highways that are being promoted between the two Koreas work to undermine the containment strategy against North Korea hitherto constructed through US-South Korea cooperation, giving the South Korean government a headache.
Needless to say the Bush Administration will pursue a dynamic foreign policy under Secretary of State Colin Powell, who is said to prefer conducting diplomacy through his Assistant Secretary and Acting Assistant Secretary rather than appointing special envoys, and who has already dismissed Charles Kartman, Special Envoy for the Korean Peace Talks.
Meanwhile, North Korea has been mostly inactive in the area of foreign relations since March, and diplomatic negotiations for General Secretary Kim Jong-Il's scheduled visits to South Korea and Russia have remained at a standstill. The North Korean government no doubt would prefer to wait for the Bush Administration's next move. Relations between the two Koreas, as well as that between Japan and North Korea, have likewise stagnated, and diplomatic matters are likely to show no progress until after the start of US-North Korean relations.
In any case, we must wait until the Bush Administration lays bare its policy towards the Korean Peninsula, and then ascertain North Korea's reactions. In the event, we must pay special attention to South Korea's domestic policies, such as how the government will respond to internal criticism and opposition against its North Korean policies, while another important focal point would be how Japan, the US and South Korea should cooperate under the present circumstances where the three countries' policy priorities are not identical.
The Bush Administration has a four-year term ahead of it, while the administration of South Korean President Kim Dae-Jung has elections coming up at the end of next year and doesn't have as much time. Under such circumstances, Japan would need to redouble its past efforts to promote strategic dialogue and policy coordination with the US and South Korea in pursuing its national interests.
The writer is a professor of international development at Takusyoku University. He is a former director of National Security Division of Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The English-Speaking Union of Japan
米国ブッシュ政権の朝鮮半島政策
森本 敏 / 拓殖大学国際開発学部教授
2001年 5月 9日
ブッシュ政権の政策は未だ、その全てが出揃っているわけではないが、この３ヶ月の傾向を見る限り、外交・安保政策を軸にして国家関係を構築し、その枠組みの中で個々の政策を動かして行こうとしているように見える。しかも、その政策アプローチは現実主義的であり、パワーポリテイクスの要素を多く持っていることも特徴である。
ブッシュ政権のアジア政策もその全貌はまだ、見えないが、少なくとも中国との関係は偵察機空中接触事件を契機にすべりだし、双方の認識を率直に理解し合い、危機管理的な対話のルートができたことは注目される。ただし、ブッシュ政権として中国の現在と将来をどのように評価するかという点はまだ、最終的な結論が出ているわけではない。
ブッシュ政権の朝鮮半島政策も未だ、決まっていない。しかし、このようなブッシュ政権の特徴を見る限り、米国は北朝鮮の指導部がもつ本質的な体質や、北朝鮮の中で変化していない対外的な脅威に対してはかなり、厳しい対応をせまることが予想される。他方、だからといってＫＥＤＯを含む米朝枠組み合意を根本的に見なおすことは、米朝間で交渉のしきりなおしを意味することになり現実的とは思えない。
そうすると米国としてとり得る方途にそれほど多くのオプションがあるとは思えない。ただし、国防関係者、例えば、太平洋軍司令官、在韓米軍司令官とも北朝鮮軍の近代化について懸念を表明しており、米国は北朝鮮に対して警戒を緩めていない。その点でブッシュ政権は韓国の包容政策をそのままの形で支持するという態度を示していないばかりか、むしろ、韓国が北朝鮮と進めている実務関係、例えば、鉄道や高速道路の連結が米韓両国が今まで構築してきた対北朝鮮抑止を損なうものという立場をとっていることは、韓国政府にとって頭痛の種である。
ブッシュ政権の外交は言うまでも無く、パウエル国務長官が中心になってダイナミックに展開することになろうが、同長官は従来のように、特使を活用して外交をするのではなく、次官補、次官補代理というラインを活用して外交をすすめるという手法をとるとも言われ、すでに、カートマン朝鮮半島問題特使を罷免している。
他方、北朝鮮の外交は３月以降、ほとんど動きがなく、金正日主席の訪韓予定も、訪ロ予定も外交事務が停止したままである。北朝鮮はまず、ブッシュ政権の出方を見極めたいという考えであろう。南北朝鮮関係も日朝関係も滞っており、こうした外交事務が動き出すのは米朝関係が動きはじめてからであろう。
ともかく、我々としてはブッシュ政権の朝鮮半島政策が明かになるのを待ちつつ、これに対する北朝鮮の対応を見極める必要がある。その際、特に、注目すべきことは韓国の内政であり、韓国政権の北朝鮮政策について韓国国内にある批判や反対に韓国政権がどのように対応するか、また、米国、韓国、日本の政策上の優先課題が少しずつ、異なっている状況下でいかにして、日・米・韓の連携を図っていくかが重要な視点である。
ブッシュ政権には今後、４年という期間があるが、金大中政権は来年末に選挙があり、米国ほど十分な時間があるわけではない。このような状況のもとで日本はその国益を追求するためには、従来にもまして、米国、韓国との戦略的な対話と政策協調を図る必要があるであろう。
（筆者は拓殖大学国際開発学部教授。元外務省情報調査局安全保障政策室長。）
ブッシュ政権のアジア政策もその全貌はまだ、見えないが、少なくとも中国との関係は偵察機空中接触事件を契機にすべりだし、双方の認識を率直に理解し合い、危機管理的な対話のルートができたことは注目される。ただし、ブッシュ政権として中国の現在と将来をどのように評価するかという点はまだ、最終的な結論が出ているわけではない。
ブッシュ政権の朝鮮半島政策も未だ、決まっていない。しかし、このようなブッシュ政権の特徴を見る限り、米国は北朝鮮の指導部がもつ本質的な体質や、北朝鮮の中で変化していない対外的な脅威に対してはかなり、厳しい対応をせまることが予想される。他方、だからといってＫＥＤＯを含む米朝枠組み合意を根本的に見なおすことは、米朝間で交渉のしきりなおしを意味することになり現実的とは思えない。
そうすると米国としてとり得る方途にそれほど多くのオプションがあるとは思えない。ただし、国防関係者、例えば、太平洋軍司令官、在韓米軍司令官とも北朝鮮軍の近代化について懸念を表明しており、米国は北朝鮮に対して警戒を緩めていない。その点でブッシュ政権は韓国の包容政策をそのままの形で支持するという態度を示していないばかりか、むしろ、韓国が北朝鮮と進めている実務関係、例えば、鉄道や高速道路の連結が米韓両国が今まで構築してきた対北朝鮮抑止を損なうものという立場をとっていることは、韓国政府にとって頭痛の種である。
ブッシュ政権の外交は言うまでも無く、パウエル国務長官が中心になってダイナミックに展開することになろうが、同長官は従来のように、特使を活用して外交をするのではなく、次官補、次官補代理というラインを活用して外交をすすめるという手法をとるとも言われ、すでに、カートマン朝鮮半島問題特使を罷免している。
他方、北朝鮮の外交は３月以降、ほとんど動きがなく、金正日主席の訪韓予定も、訪ロ予定も外交事務が停止したままである。北朝鮮はまず、ブッシュ政権の出方を見極めたいという考えであろう。南北朝鮮関係も日朝関係も滞っており、こうした外交事務が動き出すのは米朝関係が動きはじめてからであろう。
ともかく、我々としてはブッシュ政権の朝鮮半島政策が明かになるのを待ちつつ、これに対する北朝鮮の対応を見極める必要がある。その際、特に、注目すべきことは韓国の内政であり、韓国政権の北朝鮮政策について韓国国内にある批判や反対に韓国政権がどのように対応するか、また、米国、韓国、日本の政策上の優先課題が少しずつ、異なっている状況下でいかにして、日・米・韓の連携を図っていくかが重要な視点である。
ブッシュ政権には今後、４年という期間があるが、金大中政権は来年末に選挙があり、米国ほど十分な時間があるわけではない。このような状況のもとで日本はその国益を追求するためには、従来にもまして、米国、韓国との戦略的な対話と政策協調を図る必要があるであろう。
（筆者は拓殖大学国際開発学部教授。元外務省情報調査局安全保障政策室長。）
一般社団法人 日本英語交流連盟