Koizumi facing crucial moment
KOBAYASHI Yoshiaki / Professor at Keio University
March 6, 2002
The dismissal of Foreign Minister Makiko Tanaka has provoked a decline in the approval ratings of Japan's Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi. However, the undercurrent that caused voters to change their assessment of the Prime Minister may have been the concessions and compromises he made during the process of formulating the fiscal 2002 budget that started towards the end of last year.
From the beginning, the Koizumi Cabinet had owed its existence on its inclination towards reform, towards "changing politics." Yet, since the end of last year, when serious work began on putting the "Koizumi" stamp on the budget for the coming fiscal year, clashes with the so-called "forces of resistance" within the Liberal Democratic Party became a reality, and the Prime Minister was forced to concede. In particular, the ruling party's system of pre-approval proved to be a major obstacle that blocked his way. According to Constitutional provisions, the Cabinet can directly submit its bills to parliament. However, it has long been the practice to inform the LDP's General Council and seek its approval prior to Cabinet approval. As a result, Koizumi's reforms have been forced into compromise in areas such as reforming the specialized public corporations, which could be tantamount to throwing out the content to retain the title. It was within this context that problems concerning the dismissal of Foreign Minister Tanaka arose, and voters have begun to suspect Prime Minister Koizumi's resolve to "change politics," including reforming the Foreign Ministry.
Meanwhile, whether he can break this impasse by calling for general elections would also depend on the hurdles that lie ahead. One of the scenarios that was circulated at the time the Koizumi Cabinet was formed was that even if the "forces of resistance" stood in the way of his reforms, as individual legislators they would have no choice but to go along in the end, because if general elections were called after the dividing line was drawn between legislators who are "for" reform and those who are "against," voters were sure to favor the "Koizumi Party." But two conditions must be met for this scenario to work. One, the Prime Minister must be enjoying a high approval rating as the man who will resolutely go through with the reforms. Two, there must be an opportunity for forming a coalition with the Democratic Party and other opposition parties, because even if a new Koizumi Party is formed, it will be unable to capture a majority on its own.
In that sense, yellow signals are beginning to flicker on both conditions. Even worse, approval ratings could take a further blow if more public funding is pumped into financial institutions. In the case of "painful reform" in particular, voter understanding can only be gained if that pain is fair and just. In other words, if the reforms run counter to the principle of "Justice as Fairness," the next question will be - "who benefits from Koizumi's reforms?"
Should that transpire, under current circumstances it would increase the number of voters who feel that neither Prime Minister Koizumi nor the LDP, nor the Democratic Party, can represent their views. So it isn't surprising if a political realignment took place, and entirely possible for local governors who built their reputations on fiscal recovery and civilian participation to enter national politics. Prime Minister Koizumi has already reached a crucial moment, and voters won't let him get away with the tactic of "postponing reform while pretending to have completed them." It seems the only way to break the current impasse would be to present dynamic reform proposals that could regain voter confidence, and seek a yes-or-no response from each legislator.
The writer is Professor of Political Science at Keio University.
From the beginning, the Koizumi Cabinet had owed its existence on its inclination towards reform, towards "changing politics." Yet, since the end of last year, when serious work began on putting the "Koizumi" stamp on the budget for the coming fiscal year, clashes with the so-called "forces of resistance" within the Liberal Democratic Party became a reality, and the Prime Minister was forced to concede. In particular, the ruling party's system of pre-approval proved to be a major obstacle that blocked his way. According to Constitutional provisions, the Cabinet can directly submit its bills to parliament. However, it has long been the practice to inform the LDP's General Council and seek its approval prior to Cabinet approval. As a result, Koizumi's reforms have been forced into compromise in areas such as reforming the specialized public corporations, which could be tantamount to throwing out the content to retain the title. It was within this context that problems concerning the dismissal of Foreign Minister Tanaka arose, and voters have begun to suspect Prime Minister Koizumi's resolve to "change politics," including reforming the Foreign Ministry.
Meanwhile, whether he can break this impasse by calling for general elections would also depend on the hurdles that lie ahead. One of the scenarios that was circulated at the time the Koizumi Cabinet was formed was that even if the "forces of resistance" stood in the way of his reforms, as individual legislators they would have no choice but to go along in the end, because if general elections were called after the dividing line was drawn between legislators who are "for" reform and those who are "against," voters were sure to favor the "Koizumi Party." But two conditions must be met for this scenario to work. One, the Prime Minister must be enjoying a high approval rating as the man who will resolutely go through with the reforms. Two, there must be an opportunity for forming a coalition with the Democratic Party and other opposition parties, because even if a new Koizumi Party is formed, it will be unable to capture a majority on its own.
In that sense, yellow signals are beginning to flicker on both conditions. Even worse, approval ratings could take a further blow if more public funding is pumped into financial institutions. In the case of "painful reform" in particular, voter understanding can only be gained if that pain is fair and just. In other words, if the reforms run counter to the principle of "Justice as Fairness," the next question will be - "who benefits from Koizumi's reforms?"
Should that transpire, under current circumstances it would increase the number of voters who feel that neither Prime Minister Koizumi nor the LDP, nor the Democratic Party, can represent their views. So it isn't surprising if a political realignment took place, and entirely possible for local governors who built their reputations on fiscal recovery and civilian participation to enter national politics. Prime Minister Koizumi has already reached a crucial moment, and voters won't let him get away with the tactic of "postponing reform while pretending to have completed them." It seems the only way to break the current impasse would be to present dynamic reform proposals that could regain voter confidence, and seek a yes-or-no response from each legislator.
The writer is Professor of Political Science at Keio University.
The English-Speaking Union of Japan
正念場を迎えた小泉改革
小林 良彰 / 慶應義塾大学教授
2002年 3月 6日
田中外相更迭問題を契機として、小泉内閣支持率が下がり始めている。しかし、有権者が小泉首相への評価を変えた底流には、昨年末からの平成一四年度予算案作りにおける首相の譲歩・妥協があるのではないか。
そもそも、小泉内閣は、「政治を変える」という改革志向が存立の基盤にあった。しかし、「小泉らしさ」を実現するための来年度予算案作りが本格化した昨年末頃より、いわゆる抵抗勢力との対立が現実のものとなり、譲歩を余儀なくされてきた。とりわけ、小泉首相の行く手を阻んだのが与党事前承認制であった。憲法の規定により、内閣は法案を直接、国会に提出することができる。しかし、法案提出の場合、閣議決定に先立って、総務会に連絡し承認を得ることが長らく、慣例となってきた。このため、特殊法人改革などで、小泉改革は名を取って実を捨てる結果とも受け取れる譲歩を強いられている。そうした最中に起きたのが田中外相更迭問題であり、有権者は小泉首相が外務省改革を含めて、「政治を変える」ことに本気なのかどうかを疑い始めている。
それでは、今後、解散総選挙で局面打開をはかれるのかと言えば、これもハードルがある。小泉内閣発足の頃、小泉改革に抵抗勢力が出てきたとしても、最後は、「改革に賛成か反対か」で議員を色分けしてから解散総選挙すれば、有権者は小泉党に投票する、だからどの議員も改革に反対できないはず、というシナリオが伝えられていた。しかし、このシナリオが実現するためには、二つの条件が必要になる。一つは、「小泉首相＝改革を断行する人」という意味での高い支持率があること。もう一つは、小泉党ができても単独過半数を取れるわけではないから、民主党など野党との連立を組めること、である。
この点、現在では、いずれの条件も黄色信号が点り始めている。しかも、今後、金融機関への公的資金再投入をすれば、さらに支持率が下がることも考えられる。特に、「痛みを伴う改革」は、公平公正な痛みであってはじめて有権者の理解を得ることができる。その意味で、「Justice as Fairness（公正としての正義）」から反する改革であれば、「誰のための小泉改革なのか」が問われることになる。
そうなると、現状では、小泉首相にも自民党にも民主党にも、自分達の気持ちを代弁してもらえないと感じる有権者が増えることになる。このため、政界再編成が行われても不思議ではなく、特に、財政再建や住民参加などで実績を挙げた地方の知事も中央政界に参入して来ることも考えられる。すでに正念場に来た小泉首相にとって、「改革したかのように見せて改革を先送りにする」手法は、有権者には通じない。ここは、有権者の信頼を取り戻すような大胆な改革案を示した上で各議員の賛否を問うことしか、局面を打開する方法はないのではないか。
（筆者は慶応義塾大学法学部教授。）
そもそも、小泉内閣は、「政治を変える」という改革志向が存立の基盤にあった。しかし、「小泉らしさ」を実現するための来年度予算案作りが本格化した昨年末頃より、いわゆる抵抗勢力との対立が現実のものとなり、譲歩を余儀なくされてきた。とりわけ、小泉首相の行く手を阻んだのが与党事前承認制であった。憲法の規定により、内閣は法案を直接、国会に提出することができる。しかし、法案提出の場合、閣議決定に先立って、総務会に連絡し承認を得ることが長らく、慣例となってきた。このため、特殊法人改革などで、小泉改革は名を取って実を捨てる結果とも受け取れる譲歩を強いられている。そうした最中に起きたのが田中外相更迭問題であり、有権者は小泉首相が外務省改革を含めて、「政治を変える」ことに本気なのかどうかを疑い始めている。
それでは、今後、解散総選挙で局面打開をはかれるのかと言えば、これもハードルがある。小泉内閣発足の頃、小泉改革に抵抗勢力が出てきたとしても、最後は、「改革に賛成か反対か」で議員を色分けしてから解散総選挙すれば、有権者は小泉党に投票する、だからどの議員も改革に反対できないはず、というシナリオが伝えられていた。しかし、このシナリオが実現するためには、二つの条件が必要になる。一つは、「小泉首相＝改革を断行する人」という意味での高い支持率があること。もう一つは、小泉党ができても単独過半数を取れるわけではないから、民主党など野党との連立を組めること、である。
この点、現在では、いずれの条件も黄色信号が点り始めている。しかも、今後、金融機関への公的資金再投入をすれば、さらに支持率が下がることも考えられる。特に、「痛みを伴う改革」は、公平公正な痛みであってはじめて有権者の理解を得ることができる。その意味で、「Justice as Fairness（公正としての正義）」から反する改革であれば、「誰のための小泉改革なのか」が問われることになる。
そうなると、現状では、小泉首相にも自民党にも民主党にも、自分達の気持ちを代弁してもらえないと感じる有権者が増えることになる。このため、政界再編成が行われても不思議ではなく、特に、財政再建や住民参加などで実績を挙げた地方の知事も中央政界に参入して来ることも考えられる。すでに正念場に来た小泉首相にとって、「改革したかのように見せて改革を先送りにする」手法は、有権者には通じない。ここは、有権者の信頼を取り戻すような大胆な改革案を示した上で各議員の賛否を問うことしか、局面を打開する方法はないのではないか。
（筆者は慶応義塾大学法学部教授。）
一般社団法人 日本英語交流連盟